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PART 1: THE ISLAMIC STATE
MAPS
Map of Iraq and Syria: Central Location for the Islamic State

Iraq. Bing Maps. Microsoft. July 31, 2015. Retrieved from
https://www.bing.com/maps/#Y3A9MzMuMzgwODUzfjQ4Ljk1Njk3OCZsdmw9NSZzdHk9YiZxPUlyYXE=
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INSIDE LOOK/COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW:
OVERVIEW
"ISIS.” Counter Extremism Project. February, 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/taxonomy/term/3.
The Counter Extremism Project is one of the leading organizations that provides
comprehensive analysis on the state of extremism and militarized armed groups across
the globe. This report, provides an overview of the Islamic State, analyzes its places of
operation, leadership, recruitment strategies, and violent activities. The report also
outlines how foreign nations perceive and interact with the group transnationally.
“The Islamic State (Full Length).” Vice News video, 42:31. December 26, 2014.
https://news.vice.com/video/the-islamic-state-full-length
This Vice News video provides an inside look on the goals and ideals of IS. A reporter is
shown by an IS member the front lines of the fighting between the Syrian army and IS.
The video goes further by providing additional information with a focus on IS’s growth,
propaganda, and indoctrination of children to create the next generation of IS. An
additional section shows the use of the “Hisbah” to enforce morality codes in the areas
under the control of IS.
Barrett, Richard. “The Islamic State” The Soufan Group. November, 2014.
http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-StateNov14.pdf
This report by the Soufan Group provides an extensive look into the internal workings of
IS. A general summary of the group is provided followed by a description of their
growth and development. The group’s ideology and overall objectives are presented
followed by a rundown of its structure, military, administrative, financial, and media
operations. The conclusion of this piece ponders how long it will be before the
repressive and restrictive nature of IS causes the areas under its control to rise up. A
major concern of this is how much damage will IS have done by then.
Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State” Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper 13. Brookings
Institute. November, 2014.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling%20islamic%
20state%20lister/en_web_lister.pdf
This report provides a detailed overview of IS from its origins to its presence as of 2014
and provides analyses on its objectives and issues regarding the use of foreign fighters.
The section titled “The Islamic State Today” provides information on the group’s policies
military strategies, and governance of controlled areas. The section regarding foreign
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fighters starts on page 34 of the report and flows into the policy recommendations for
countering ISIS. The recommendations include stopping IS’s revenue flows, disrupting
manpower and resources, targeting of their leadership, and stabilizing Iraq and Syria.
MULTI-FACETED ORGANIZATION

Fromson, James., and Steven Simon. “ISIS: The Dubious Paradise of Apocalypse Now.” Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy, 57 no. 3 (May 19, 2015): 7-56.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1046222
This source describes IS as having four different manifestations. The group is a guerilla
army, a Sunni political movement, an extremist Islamist group and an oppressive
regional administrator. Each of these four aspects is described in detail and the author
concludes with suggesting that aggressive containment is the only effective currently
available option for countering IS.
Weiss, Michael., and Hassan Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts,
2015.
This book starts by describing the growth and development of IS and highlights their use
of propaganda, executions and use of foreign recruits to expand their presence in the
Middle East. It further goes on to profile key members and tell their history before
joining the group and what role they had in the evolution of IS. The authors discuss the
impact of what is described as “political and military maneuvering” by U.S., Iran, Iraq,
and Syria and how it impacted the expansion of IS.
IDEOLOGY OF IS

Reuter, Christopher. “‘I’m not a Butcher’: An Interview with Islamic State’s Architect of Death.”
Spiegel Online International, July 16, 2015.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-conversation-with-an-isis-suicidebomber-logistician-a-1043485.html
Der Spiegel conducted an interview with incarcerated Islamic State suicide bombing
coordinator, Abu Abdullah. Abdullah explained his motivations and his role in the
process of the bombings. His job was to create the bombs and direct the bombers to
the targets. His motivations were simply that he needed to kill the infidels and drive
them out of Iraq.
Bunzel, Cole. “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State.” Brookings
Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World: Analysis Paper 19 (March, 2015):1-45.
Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-ofislamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf
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Cole Bunzel, in his research article begins by examining the ideologies of the group and
its particular brand of Jihadi-Salafism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya). The history of IS’s
formation and development is detailed along with its split from AQ and the making of
itself into a new entity. Bunzel then looks at the establishment of the caliphate by IS and
the implications surrounding this.
“ULTRA-VIOLENCE” AS STRATEGY/POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Jones, David Martin., and M.L.R. Smith. “The Strategy of Savagery: Explaining the Islamic
State.” War on the Rocks, February 24, 2015. http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/thestrategy-of-savagery-explaining-the-islamic-state/
The author evaluates the flawed perspective of some analysts regarding the members of
IS, and the strategic purpose behind the televised executions and atrocities conducted
by IS members. The author states that the presentation of IS terrorists as having
grievances against Western policy, morals, and being the victims of Islamophobia or
personality disorders are detrimental to counterterrorism. Treating jihadism as the
result of personality traits does not offer a concrete platform to build a solid defense.
The use of “ultra-violence” or savage tactics and executions is a deliberate strategy
targeting Western sensibilities. The jihadist’s strategy of placing more value and
symbolism on death and martyrdom provides a sanctified rationale that celebrates all
aspects of death.

ISLAMIC STATE – ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION:
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF AQI

Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. “Testing the Surge: Why Did
Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37, No. 1 (Cambridge: MIT Press
Journals, 2012). 7-40. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00087
This article evaluates competing hypotheses regarding the relative importance of the
surge and the Anbar Awakening in reducing Iraq’s violence and. Without one another,
the surge and the Anbar Awakening were critical components that provided the military
capabilities as well as support from the local population to achieve the
counterinsurgency objectives of the U.S. The authors propose thorough evidence and
analyses to support how two major arguments - sectarian segregation caused by
infighting and the role of the Awakening to dilute al-Qaeda in Iraq - helped reduce
violence in 2007. Without the Awakening and the Sons of Iraq, the article concludes, the
surge would have been inefficient in managing levels of violence.
Kirdar, M.J. “Al Qaeda in Iraq.” Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program Transnational
Threats Project. Case Study 1. Center for Strategic & International Studies. June, 2011.
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http://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf
This case study covers the formation and development of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the
predecessor to ISI, which would become ISIS, then ISIL and finally IS. AQI, led by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi fought alongside other AQ groups and the Taliban against the U.S. in
Afghanistan and then would transfer back Iraq to play a central role in the 2003-2007
insurgency. The brutal tactics of AQI led to a decline in its popularity amongst Iraqis and
the death of Zarqawi in 2006 led to a weakened and diminished group.
ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI

Hafez, Mohammed. Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom.
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007.
This book covers the use of suicide bombings as a weapon of insurgencies and terror
organizations. Using open source information and interviews with U.S. service
members, the author compares the different ideology, origins and characteristics of
factions that were involved in the insurgency form 2003-2006 including Zarqawi’s
followers and Jihadi Salafis. The appendix includes, a list of all the Sunni insurgent
groups in Iraq from 2003-2006, the names and nationalities of known suicide bombers,
AQ’s evolution in Iraq, and Zarqawi’s associates.
Weaver, Mary Anne. “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” Atlantic, June 8, 2006.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abumusab-al-zarqawi/304983/
This article provides a detailed account of Zarqawi’s transition from a violent gang
member to a jihadi fighting in Afghanistan and finally into the leader of AQI. Originally
named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Halaylah, Zarqawi changed his name before going to
fight in Iraq. Zarqawi was not particularly religious until after a six year stint in prison
and a second trip to Afghanistan in 2001. After this he adhered to extremist views and
would form his own group that would engage in a campaign of brutal attacks and
suicide bombings. Zarqawi would rise in the ranks but his unpopular tactics resulted in
him being demoted within the organization before he was killed.
Evolution and Growth of IS
THE ROLE OF BUCCA PRISON AND ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI

Chulov, Martin. “Isis: the Inside Story.” Guardian, December 11, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story
This article describes the role of Bucca prison and its impact on the growth of IS. Sunni
militant members and AQ members were able to coordinate and plan in a way they
never would have been able to outside of the prison. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, upon
release from Bucca, used his connections from there to join in the fighting against Shia
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Muslims in Iraq. The death of Zarqawi and his successor, Abu Omar, allowed alBaghdadi, as described by a former acquaintance as “the most bloodthirsty of all,” to
take charge.
THE ROLE OF MALIKI’S POLICIES ON THE CREATION OF IS

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “Violence in Iraq.” Middle East Forum. Fall 2012.
http://www.meforum.org/3375/iraq-violence
This article analyzes the levels of violence in Iraq under Maliki’s heavy-handed policies.
The disregard for the rule of law, use of the Iraqi Security Forces for sectarian purposes,
political impasse among the government’s various factions, and inability to root alQaeda in Iraq from its strongholds presented ripe conditions for cyclical patterns of
violence to spread through Iraq shortly after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011.
SUNNI UPRISING/REVOLUTION AND ITS ROLE IN THE CREATION OF ISIS

“The Rise of ISIS.” Frontline, PBS video, 53:40. October 28, 2014.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/rise-of-isis/
This video shows the role of internal divisions within the Iraqi government post U.S.
withdrawal. A strong and violent crackdown on local Sunni Muslims and former
Baathists by the Maliki government based on fears of a Sunni attempt to seize control of
the government. AQI was still operating outside of the city, though decimated, the
surviving members were experienced fighters. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, after a stint in a
U.S. prison was now leading AQI and utilized the Syrian conflict in order grow, train, and
recruit Sunni Muslims who were looking to strike at Shia governments of Syria and Iraq.
The Sunni uprising in Iraq in response to government crackdowns allowed AQI, now
seen as IS, to take root and seize power.
AQI RESURGENCE AND THE CREATION OF IS

This is a collection of articles from Institute for the Study of War by Jessica Lewis concerning
AQI and how it morphed into the Islamic State.
Lewis, Jessica D. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent.” Institute for the Study of War.
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent
This report details the revival of al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2012-2013 after its initial
degradation throughout much of 2007-2008. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
(VBIED) attacks remained the signature type of attack after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011.
Safe-havens and recruiting grounds in Syria, as well as the replenishment of AQI’s
veteran manpower through multiple prison breaks across Iraq. The article analyzes AQI’s
“Breaking the Walls” campaign which sought to establish governance across Iraq and
Syria while aiming to retake territory it had formally controlled.
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---------- “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Part II.” Institute for the Study of War.
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent-part-ii
This report supplements Part I by focusing on the geography, volume, interval, and
selected targets which characterized al-Qaeda in Iraq’s waves of violence and prison
attacks. It proceeds to detail the evolution of AQI’s military organization over the 20122013 time period. AQI’s VBIED capabilities are assessed in the context of operational
planning and how this re-organizes AQI as a military organization as opposed to a
leader-centric terrorist organization.
---------- “AQI’s ‘Soldier’s Harvest’ Campaign.” Institute for the Study of War. 9 October 2013.
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/aqis-soldiers-harvest-campaign
This report examines the campaign launched by al-Qaeda in Iraq in late 2013 to control
key terrain in Iraq while targeting any Sunnis who work for the government. By
analyzing the contest for control between AQI and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), this
report documents the intimidation and displacement of Iraqi soldiers and government
officials by AQI.
POST-SURGE REVIVAL OF IS

A collection of articles by Craig Whiteside of the United States Naval War College at Naval Post
Graduate School evaluating the revival of AQI as The Islamic State in Iraq
“Behind The Revival of the Islamic State in Iraq, Interview with Naval War College Prof Craig
Whiteside.” Musings on Iraq. June 22, 2015.
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2015/06/behind-revival-of-islamic-state-iniraq.html
This interview analyzes pivotal aspects which led to the revival of the Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI), including jailhouse radicalization, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s
autocratic politics, and the disputed role of former Baathists among the ranks of Islamic
State’s leadership. The interview proceeds to detail the tactics employed by Islamic
State to regain control over areas it had been expelled from during the surge and offers
an assessment of contemporary U.S. and Iraqi counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
strategies.
Whiteside, Craig. “War, Interrupted, Part I: The Roots of the Jihadist Resurgence in Iraq.” War
on the Rocks. November 5, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/war-interruptedpart-i-the-roots-of-the-jihadist-resurgence-in-iraq/
This article argues that Islamic State utilized the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 as a
pretext for its resurgence which established a robust political coalition. Islamic State’s
carefully crafted military campaigns dedicated to defeating America’s Sunni allies and
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undermining the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces paved the way for three
strategic objectives: 1) establishing sanctuaries in their former core areas after
eliminating the Awakening members, 2) recruiting experienced fighters that could
contribute immediately, and 3) a slow rollback of ISF to allow IS to expand its governing
functions on behalf of the Sunnis of Iraq.
--------- “War, Interrupted, Part II: From Prisoners to Rulers.” War on the Rocks. November 6,
2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/war-interrupted-part-ii-from-prisoners-torulers/
This article continues from Part I by examining Islamic State’s coordinated campaign to
target the Iraq’s criminal justice system with assassination squads targeting judges,
prosecutors, investigators, prison staff, and witnesses, while also targeting crime labs,
detention facilities, and courtrooms. In addition to waves of prison breaks, IS also
featured the targeting of checkpoints manned by Iraqi Security Forces in its propaganda
videos to showcase the central government’s weaknesses. This article offers a closer
examination of events on the ground which are prohibiting national reconciliation or the
establishment of a new “Awakening Council” from coming to fruition.
EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION

Sowell, Kirk "The Islamic State’s Eastern Frontier: Ramadi and Fallujah as Theaters of Sectarian
Conflict." Perspectives on Terrorism, 9 no. 4 (August, 2015): 130-141. Terrorism
Research Initiative.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/449
This article discusses the role of sectarian conflict in Ramadi and Fallujah and how IS has
used it to its advantage. The mishandling of the Sunni population by the Iraqi
government gave IS the instability it needed to grow in Iraq and served as a recruitment
tool. Many Sunnis and Sunni “tribal shaykhs” do not fall in line with IS ideology or end
goals but seen a necessary military alliance with IS as a way to combat what is seen as
an Iranian controlled government and militia forces. While IS does not have the
numbers to occupy and hold these areas, it can use them as staging areas for attack
with the support of the aforementioned parts of the population.
Cockburn, Patrick. The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. New York:
Verso, 2015.
This book provides a detailed look at the environment that led to the creation and
expansion of the IS. The war in Syria and any form of western involvement/aid was
utilized to build the group through recruitment, training, and seizing of weapons and
materials meant for anti-Assad militias. This chaotic field and the Sunni uprising in Iraq
would open the door for IS to seize control in a fractured area. The author claims that
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the underestimation of IS in its early stages by U.S. and coalition forces helped to
contribute to the expansion of the group.
Price, Brian., Dan Milton, and Nelly Lahoud. “The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding
the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State.” Combating Terrorism Center. 2014.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-theevolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state
This report from the CTC provides a thorough look at the Islamic State. It serves to show
the origins and formation of the group and identify its operational strengths and
weaknesses. It also compares IS to other militant/extremist groups that the U.S. has
fought against and concludes with an examination of the strategic challenges and
opportunities faced by countries engaged in counterterrorism efforts against IS.
IS CONNECTIONS TO SADDAM’S BAATH PARTY AND AQI

Orton, Kyle. ”Saddam’s Former Loyalists are Leading ISIS-as True Believers.” National Review,
July 20, 2015. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421370/saddams-formerloyalists-are-leading-isis-true-believers-kyle-orton
Some reports argue that the Islamic State is a front for a resurgent Baathist party;
however, the former Baathists involved had already shifted to a more radical belief
system before joining IS. In 1993, Saddam Hussein conducted a campaign of promoting
Salafism in order to counter the encroaching Muslim Brotherhood. As the “SaddamistSalafism” took hold and spread, it gathered a greater following within the Baath party.
When Saddam’s regime collapsed, many of its members had already moved on to
accept new Salafi-based ideologies that would mesh well with the IS ideology.
Tønnessen, Truls H. Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The relationship between al-Qaida in Iraq and
the Islamic State.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no.4 (April, 2015):48-60. Terrorism
Research Initiative.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/443/874
This author examines the level of residual connections between IS and its predecessor,
AQI. The study is based off of information regarding the backgrounds and roles of the
top leaders of AQI/IS over the past decade while examining their connections to the
Baath party. While the Islamic State is the successor to AQI, the AQ connected Jabhat alNusra, share connections with several of the same groups that gave the start to AQI.
However, IS, after the fall of AQI, seems to be made up of mainly the Iraqi faction of AQI
with ties to several former Baathist party members or were Baathist themselves.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH REGIONAL GROUPS/STATES

Simonelli, Corina. “The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): Relationships
2004-2014.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism. June, 2014.
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http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_EvolutionofISILRelationships_FactSheet_June2
014.pdf
This document shows the relationships between IS and various militias and terrorist
groups and local countries. It shows who they are fighting and who they collaborate
with, and which groups changed from supporting them to fighting them.

ISLAMIC STATE – DECLINE:
OVERVIEW
"Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps." BBC News, January 10, 2018.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.
This article explores the evolving conflict with ISIS in Iraq and Syria through interactive
imagery and maps. The visuals demonstrate the territory taken and lost, concentration
and number of coalition strikes against ISIS, and various other infographics that paint a
holistic picture of the Islamic State and their operations.
Lockie, Alex. "ISIS Fighters, Once Bent on Martyrdom, Surrender en Masse from Last Iraqi
Stronghold." Business Insider, October 9, 2017. http://www.businessinsider.com/isisfighters-surrender-en-mass-iraq-2017-10.
In direct contrast to the retaking of Mosul, when U.S. backed coalition forces and Iranian
backed militias recaptured Hawijah, they met with little resistance and large-scale
surrender of ISIS fighters. In previous events, ISIS members were more interested in last
stands and suicide attacks whereas they were supposedly seeking to surrender to
Kurdish forces because they would be more likely to take prisoners than other groups.
After the fall of Hawijah, ISIS only maintains a small area of land in Iraq.
Mooney, Miachael J. "Iraq the Islamic State, and War Termination." Small Wars Journal,
September 5, 2017. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/iraq-the-islamic-state-andwar-termination.
CIWAG Senior Associate Col Michael J. Mooney offered direction and guidance on Iraqi
Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi’s statements regarding his policy goals following the
defeat of ISIS. Col Mooney focused on in particular the need to track down all the
scattered elements of ISIS to prevent them from repeating the scenario of when AQI
dispersed and then reappeared as ISIS. Just as important is the need to make
fundamental changes within Iraq that address the reasons as to why extremist groups
have found such fertile ground there.
Mooney, Mike. "Calusewitz Takes Down the Caliphate: The Center of Gravity in the Destruction
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of the State of the Islamic State." Small Wars Journal, January 14, 2014.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/clausewitz-takes-down-the-caliphate-the-centerof-gravity-in-the-destruction-of-the-state-o.
CIWAG Senior Associate, Col. Mike Mooney’s latest on ISIS examines the military
strategy that has crippled ISIS as viewed by Clausewitz’s center of gravity and other
principles from his book On War. To bring down ISIS, it would take more than a
liberation of the territory held by the group, it would also require a liberation from their
“military, political, economic, and ideological centers of gravity.”
EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
Ridgewell, Henry. "Huge Decline in ISIS Propaganda Mirrors Losses on Battlefield." VOA News,
December 1, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/isis-propaganda-declies-mirrorslosses-on-battlefield/4144838.html.
As ISIS loses more territory and fighters, the tone and content of its media campaigns
have shifted. The videos are produced much less frequently and contain only small
groups of ISIS members and very few vehicles. The focus has shifted from glamorizing
ISIS held areas to calling for attacks in Western countries.
Winter, Charlie. "Is Islamic State losing control of its 'virtual caliphate'?" BBC News, November
9, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east41845285?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campai
gn&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report.
CIWAG case study author, Charlie Winter, published a recent article on changing use of
media by ISIS. Since it came to power, ISIS has utilized media and imagery to push
propaganda and to portray territory under its control as idyllic. As ISIS faces more
defeats and continues to fracture into scattered insurgencies the rate and content of its
publications has shifted. At the height of its control in 2015, ISIS was releasing over 200
videos and photos a week in addition to magazines and radio programs. Now there are
fewer than 20 items released total and they focus solely on combat.
REVITALIZATION EFFORTS
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, Jacob Zenn, and Nathaniel Barr. "Islamic State 2021: Possible Futures
in North and West Africa." Foundation for Defense of Democracies. February 2017.
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Rep
ort.pdf.
This report from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies looks to the future of ISIS
in Africa as it continues to lose gorund in the Middle East. “It is possible that ISIS’ global
decline could also paradoxically help the group in North and West Africa, as state and
non-state actors shift resources from batting ISIS to other seemingly more urgent issues,
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giving the group the breathing room it needs to regenerate. A forecast of ISIS activity in
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, the Lake Chad region, Mali, and Senegal is presented.”
"ISIS Announces Forced Enlistment Amid Leadership Losses in Deir ez-Zor." Rudaw, March 8,
2017. http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/030820172.
As ISIS continues to lose territory and members in the face of SDF and coalition forces,
they issued a demand for all men between 20 and 30 in ISIS held territory to report to
“mobilization offices” in less than a week. Coalition forces have enacted a heavy toll on
ISIS leadership, recently killing several explosive and chemical weapon specialists, a
chemical weapons plant and the leader of the Albanian foreign fighters.
POST-IS POWER VACUUM
Seftel, Bennett. "Al Qaeda Spinoffs Rise from Syrian Ashes." Cipher Brief, October 12, 2017.
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/al-qaeda-spinoffs-rise-syrianashes.
As ISIS is nearing its defeat in Syria, Al Qaeda affiliated groups are moving in to fill the
vacuum. Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) which consists of what was originally Jabhat alNusra then Jabhat Fateh el-Sham and four smaller Syrian jihadi groups has entrenched
itself in Idlib province and consolidated its power. Militants from other groups have
been joining this growing organization, attracted to its anti-Assad and anti-Shia stance.
Despite its current regional focus, the group has threatened to target the U.S. once it
topples Assad.

LEADERSHIP/KEY PERSONNEL:
ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI
Callimachi, Rukmini. "ISIS Releases Recording Said to Be of Its Leader." New York Times,
September 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/world/middleeast/islamicstate-baghdadi.html.
The Islamic State issues a new propaganda recording featuring al-Baghdadi. It has been
almost a year since the last time al-Baghdadi released any statements. He claims that
the West is living in terror due to the actions of IS. This recording may have been issues
to counter statements by Russian forces and the Syrian Human Rights Observatory
claiming that al-Baghdadi may have been killed in a Russian airstrike on IS
leaders. During the time of these statements, U.S. officials remained skeptical of their
validity.
Ingram, Haroro J., and Craig Whiteside. “Don’t Kill The Caliph! The Islamic State and the Pitfalls
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of Leadership Decapitation.” War on the Rocks. June 2, 2016.
http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/dont-kill-the-caliph-the-islamic-state-and-thepitfalls-of-leadership-decapitation/
Striking ISIS from the top-down may inspire a new charismatic leader and resurgence or
cause a splintering that results in dangerous factions without any operational control.
However, degrading the group with ISIS’ leadership intact would severely impact the
ideology behind their caliphate project.
Di Giovanni, Janine. “Who is ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?” Newsweek, December 8, 2014.
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/12/19/who-isis-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi290081.html
This article starts by relaying the statement of an attendee of the Mosque where
Baghdadi made a rare public appearance. Abu Ali, claimed that there was complete and
total control of the appearance, from the recording, to forcing all attendees to swear
allegiance, and not allowing them to leave the Mosque until at least 30 minutes after he
had left. The article provides a background and personality analysis on al-Baghdadi,
originally named Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri. Firsthand accounts collected by
neighbors described him as being reserved, very traditional, and could be seen
frequently carrying religious books around instead of going to the café with other men.
He pursued a religious education and founded an insurgent group titled Jamaat Jaish Ahl
al Sunnah wal Jamma in 2004 in response to the U.S. presence in Iraq. He was captured
and sent to Camp Bucca where he used his time there to form a network of other
militants. Upon his release he became involved with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and then
form the group into the Islamic State in Iraq.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERSHIP
Chan, Francis. "Efforts Under Way to Verify Chatter About Death of Indonesian ISIS Leader
Linked to Marina Bay Plot." Straits Times, October 16, 2017.
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/efforts-underway-to-verify-chatter-aboutthe-death-of-indonesian-isis-leader-linked-to.
A multi-agency effort is underway to verify the veracity of the claims that Bahrun Naim,
the ISIS affiliated terrorist who was the orchestrator of the 2016 attack in Jakarta, was
killed in Syria. Naim’s lawyer stated that he received word of his death and several
analysts had seen it communicated on several platforms that terror groups often use,
but officials are waiting for visual or DNA proof from local authorities before issuing an
official confirmation of Naim’s death.
"IS Southeast Asia Chief Killed in Philippines." Agence France-Presse, October 16, 2017.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2017/10/16/is-southeast-asia-chief-killed-inphilippines.html.
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Isnilon Hapilon, emir of IS in Southeast Asia, and Omar Maute, one of the two leading
Maute brothers of the Maute group were killed by Philippine government forces during
operations to retake Marawi. The size and scope of the attack caused concern that the
city would be used as a base of operations for ISIS in the area. Hapilon had a $5 million
bounty on him and DNA testing is being conducted to completely confirm his death.
Iaccino, Ludovica. "Who is Isnilon Hapilon? The Charismatic ISIS Emir at Heart of Philippines’
Marawi Siege." International Business Times, June 13, 2017.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/who-isnilon-hapilon-charismatic-isis-emir-heart-philippinesmarawi-siege-1626101.
Isnilon Hapilon joined Abu Sayyaf sometime in the late 1990’s. He climbed the ranks
through his involvement in abduction for ransom of civilians and military members
including the 2001 abduction of 20 civilians from a private resort. In 2014, he and his
followers split from the main Abu Sayyaff Group and pledged to ISIS.
ADDITIONAL LEADERSHIP
Lister, Charles. “Islamic State Senior Leadership: Who’s Who.” Brookings. October 20, 2014.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling%20isla
mic%20state%20lister/en_whos_who.pdf
This collection of IS leadership (as of October 2014) provides an image if available, a
brief description of the person their role in IS and their status if known.

ISLAMIC STATE – MILITARY OPERATIONS:
OVERVIEW
Knights, Michael. “ISIL’s Political-Military Power in Iraq.” CTC Sentinel. August 27, 2014.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/isils-political-military-power-in-iraq
This article describes the attacks and multi-year offensive undertaken by IS in Iraq. The
article details the difficulties in attaining accurate information due to the collapse of the
federal security forces in Iraq. Based on the information available, the author states
that IS was able to achieve its level of military success not due to its abilities as a fighting
force but to a weak and unprepared local security force which did not react well to the
surprise and mobility of ISIS attacks.
OFFENSIVES & BATTLES
"Syria Situation Report: October 10-24, 2017." Institute for the Study of War. October 26, 2017.
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-situation-report-october-10-242017.
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This situation report from the Institute for the Study of War shows recent actions
conducted by ISIS, regime forces, Russian forces, Turkish forces and the coalition backed
SDF. The liberation of Raqqa was a major blow to ISIS and at the same time there were
several coordinated actions against Kurdish forces in the wake of the independence
referendum fallout
“A Visual Guide to the Crisis in Iraq and Syria,” New York Times, July 27, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isisconflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html?ref=middleeast
This collection of maps and stories from the New York Times tracks the IS offensive from
its early beginnings as AQI all the way up to July of 2015. Each entry provides a brief
description of the attack along with a map documenting it or other chart or graphic.
Some of the entries provide links to the full article related to the particular event or
attack.
TAL AFAR - IRAQ

"Tal Afar Battle: Iraqi Forces ' Breach IS Defences to Reach City Centre'." BBC News, August 25,
2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41054044.
Tal Afar, one of ISIS’ last areas of control in Iraq is becoming closer to being recaptured
by Iraqi military and militia forces, including the largely Shia ,Popular Mobilisation
(Hashd al-Shaabi) force. Estimates claim there are 2,000 ISIS members left in Tal Afar
though there are concerns for the safety of the potential 40,000 civilians still living there
as the campaign continues.
"Iraq Army Launches Aerial Offensive Against IS-Controlled Tal Afar." Deutsche Welle, August
15, 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/iraq-army-launches-aerial-offensive-against-iscontrolled-tal-afar/a-40092412.
Iraqi forces in preparation for the offensive to retake Tal Afar, have been conducting
airstrikes against ISIS fortifications and buildings. Ground forces are already in position
to move into the city once they airstrikes are complete. There are concerns regarding
instability for Tal Afar even after ISIS is ousted. The city was a focal point of sectarian
violence in the past and local Sunnis are concerned that they will be forced out by the
Shia forces advancing with the army.
RAQQA – SYRIA

"U.S. Backed Forces Say IS Outsed from Syria's Raqqa." VOA News, October 18, 2017.
https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-raqqa-/4073621.html.
The coalition of Syrian Democratic Forces claimed to have retaken Raqqa and seized
ISIS’s last two strongholds, a hospital being used as a command center and a stadium.
Raqqa served as the capital of ISIS in the region and as their chief base of planning and
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operations. Deir el-Zour is still facing fighting along with areas south of the Euphrates
river valley.
MARAWI SIEGE - PHILIPPINES

"The House Behind the Philippine Rebel Siege of Marawi." Reuters, October 30, 2017.
https://reuters.com/video/2017/10/30/the-house-behind-the-philippine-rebelsi?videoId=372842695.
A look into the building where Isnilon Hapilon and his followers planned the attack on
Marawi shows how well prepared they were. When security forces first tried to capture
him before the siege, Hapilon escaped through a hole blasted in the back of the house
and then gathered his followers for the attack on Marawi. Locals claim to have had no
idea there were extremists living nearby and claimed they would have turned him in if
they knew. With Isnilon and Omar Maute’s deaths, the inhabitants of Marawi hope to
begin the long process of rebuilding.
Dancel, Raul. "Timeline of Crisis in Philippine Southern City of Marawi." Straits Times, October
16, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/timeline-of-crisis-in-philippinesouthern-city-of-marawi.
A timeline detailing the development and expected conclusion of the Marawi Siege
shows the rapid consolidation capabilities of the IS affiliated groups in Southeast Asia.
The almost five month long siege began after a failed attempt to capture the militant
leader Isnilon Hapilon.
Goldman, Russell. “The Latest Unrest in the Southern Philippines, Explained.” New York Times,
May 25, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/asia/philippines-martiallaw-marawi-mindanao.html
The southern city of Marawi was besieged and occupied by militants linked to ISIS. The
Maute group and Abu Sayyaf launched an attack on the city after the failed attempt by
Philippine security forces to capture Abu Sayyaf’s leader, Isnilon Hapilon. The city is has
been damaged by the groups and several hostages have been taken.
“Fighting Reignites near Marawi Mosque.” ABS-CBN, August 25, 2016.
http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/25/17/fighting-reignites-near-marawi-mosque
The Grand Mosque of Marawi was used as the main base of operations by the Maute
group. Security forces carefully recaptured the mosque to avoid damaging it yet within a
day, fighting renewed as Maute forces moved back into nearby buildings. Marawi has
been under the control of ISIS affiliated militants since May 23 and the death toll has
climbed over 770.
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MISCELLANEOUS RECENT ATTACKS

Mukhashaf, Mohammad. "At Least Six Killed in Yemen Suicide Bombing Claimed by Islamic
State." Reuters, November 14, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemensecurity/at-least-six-killed-in-yemen-suicide-bombing-claimed-by-islamic-stateidUSKBN1DE0LP.
A suicide car bombing in the port city of Aden in southern Yemen that was claimed by
ISIS resulted in the deaths of six people. The attack was launched on a base being used
by Yemen’s security forces that are allied with the Saudi-led coalition. The ongoing war
between Saudi-backed forces and the Iranian-backed Houthis has resulted in over
10,000 casualties and created opportunities for groups like ISIS to establish themselves
in Yemen.
Walsh, Declan, and Nour Youssef. "Militants Kill 305 at Sufi Mosque in Egypt’s Deadliest
Terrorist Attack." New York Times, November 24, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/middleeast/mosque-attackegypt.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=A244723CA8BDB72606595D84D0102749&gwt=pa
y.
A bomb was detonated inside a Sufi mosque in the North Sinai region of Egypt and 2530 gunmen waited outside to shoot any worshipers who escaped the explosion. There
were at least 305 people killed with over 120 injured. No group has taken credit for the
attack, however, the ISIS affiliated force, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis has been active in the
region and has conducted other serious attacks including the destruction of a Russian
passenger plane in 2015. For additional information on why Sufi’s are often targeted by
ISIS and groups like it see the following: The Terrorist Attack against Sufi Muslims in
Egypt, Explained.
Gul, Ayaz. "Suicide Bomber Kills 8 in Eastern Afghanistan." VOA News, November 23, 2017.
https://www.voanews.com/a/suicide-bomber-kills-8-in-easternafghanistan/4131558.html.
A suicide bombing in Jalalabad, claimed by ISIS resulted in the deaths of eight people
and wounded an additional sixteen. The bombing follows in the wake of ISIS members
operating out of the Achin district beheaded fifteen of their own for wanting to leave
the group and accept a government peace offer. An additional attack was conducted
near Kabul on a Georgian military convoy resulted in three Georgian soldiers being
wounded.
EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS
“Islamic State Weapons in Iraq and Syria: Analysis of weapons and ammunition captured from
Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria.” Dispatch from the Field. Conflict Armament
Research, September, 2014. http://conflictarm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Dispatch_IS_Iraq_Syria_Weapons.pdf
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This report shows various weapons captured from IS. The majority of the weapons
captures are small arms included Ak-47’s, Chinese-made LMG’s, various pistols, a
Croatian-made sniper rifle and several U.S.–made M-16 rifles. In addition to small arms,
two M79 HEAT anti-tank rockets were captured from IS by the YPG in June of 2014.
COMMAND STRUCTURE/METRICS AND TRACKING
Bilger, Alex. “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal a Metrics-Driven Military Command.” Backgrounder.
Institute for the Study of War, May 22, 2014.
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISWBackgrounder_ISIS_Annual_R
eports_0.pdf
This report provides a look into how IS measures its goals by conducting an organizing
tracking system of its attacks. Using an annual report, IS tracks the number, kind, and
success rate of attacks and the operating area of each one as well tracking prisoner
escapes, establishment of checkpoints, cites taken and all of the sub-metrics associated
with those. The annual report indicates that IS has an organized military command as
far as operations in Iraq are concerned.
TACTICS AND METHODS
GENERAL TACTICS USED

Georgy, Micahel. "After Mosul, ISIS Digs In For Geurrila Warfare." Reuters, July 20, 2017.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-insurgency/after-mosul-islamicstate-digs-in-for-guerrilla-warfare-idUSKBN1A50ML.
As ISIS lost control of Mosul, sizeable portions of the group were reported to have fled
to the Hamrin mountains. These remote areas provide shelter and a layer of natural
defenses that are difficult to penetrate. While the main strongholds are being liberated,
a length guerilla war is likely.
“Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs.” Conflict Armament Research.
February, 2016.
http://www.conflictarm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/Tracing_The_Supply_of_Components_Used_in_Islamic_State
_IEDs.pdf
This report examines more than 700 components spanning 51 companies and 20
countries used by ISIL forces to manufacture IEDs, identifying their provenance and
tracing their supply chains of custody. The evidence was compiled from a 20-month
investigation in Iraq and Syria.
Anderson, Gary. “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Theory and Practice of Jihad.” Small Wars
Journal. August 12, 2014.
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http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-the-theory-andpractice-of-jihad
This article delivers an extensive view on al-Baghdadi’s leadership but more so on the
tactics used by IS. IS is a mobile, fast moving army that knows its capabilities and
normally does not commit itself to a fight that it cannot win. The article examines the
IS’s psychological warfare and use of broadcasted executions are evaluated along with
the role of using foreign fighters and new recruits as fodder in order to preserve the
group’s experienced forces. Despite the fast moving success of ISIS, there are
weaknesses. The author states that IS can be its own undoing if it overreaches
SHOCK TROOPS

Colquhoun, Cameron. “Tip of the Spear? Meet ISIS’ Special Operations Unit, Katibat al-Battar.”
Bellingcat. February 16, 2016.
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/02/16/tip-of-the-spear-meet-isisspecial-operations-unit-katibat-al-battar/
A little-known group of battle-hardened and highly capable Libyans are the common
factor behind many of the major terrorist attacks in Europe and North Africa since 2014,
including the attack on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris.
“A Secret to IS Success: Shock Troops Who Fight to the Death.” New York Times, July 8, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/07/08/world/middleeast/ap-ml-inside-thecaliphate-tactics.html?_r=3&referrer
IS has developed and utilized a group of “special forces”, known as Inghemasiyoun,
which are shock troops used to create chaos before the main invasion party. The shock
troops often follow the suicide bombers, who soften up entry points into a city. The
regional commanders then use the shock troops' skills in creative ways, including using
sandstorms to infiltrate an area. After these shock troops have pushed into an area, and
have fought as far as they can go they detonate explosives belts allowing for additional
forces to advance during the chaos.
INFILTRATION AND EXPANSION

Fairfield, Hannah, Tim Wallace and Derek Watkins. “How ISIS Expands.” New York Times, May,
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/21/world/middleeast/how-isisexpands.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-columnregion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&smid=pl-share
The central goal of IS is expansion. The group continues to take over key cities in Iraq
and Syria with the aim of building a broad colonial empire across many countries. A year
after announcing its expansion goals, it is operating or has cells in more than a dozen
countries. This series of graphics provides visual representations of IS advancement and
describes a three part method of expanding their territory. This expansion process
25 | P a g e

consists of Controlling and Governing area in which IS already has a significant presence,
infiltration of communities through intimidation of local leaders, and also absorbing
other groups through pledges of loyalty or bayat.
Whiteside, Craig. “ISIL’s Small Ball Warfare: An Effective Way to Get Back into a Ballgame.” War
on the Rocks, April 29, 2015. http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/isils-small-ballwarfare-an-effective-way-to-get-back-into-a-ballgame/
The author, using the article originally published by Der Spiegel that contained the
personal papers of IS member Haji Bakr, evaluates and examines the IS’s expansionary
tactics. IS organized small groups to infiltrate villages and extort, threaten and
assassinate elders in order to exert influence over communities. During the awakening,
Sahwa forces were integral in forcing IS out and into a marginal condition. However, IS
was able to rebuild, and conducted attacks on Sahwa groups in particular. The town of
Jurf is used as an example, in which from 2008 - 2013, 53 of the 133 total attacks
targeted the Sahwa. The tactics that were discussed in the Haji Baker papers in 2012
were likely an evolution of the tactics that had previously been used in Jurf. This style of
protracted, targeted attacks allows IS to remove the pro-government network in key
areas and replace it with its own “government” and coerce the support from the locals.
USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

Kuntz, Katrin. “Islamic State’s Child Soldiers: First Come the Sweets, Then the Beheadings.”
Spiegel Online
International. July 29, 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-statehow-the-is-trains-child-soldiers-a-1103941.html
First-hand accounts of how ISIS uses children to further its objective of creating a
caliphate. The children’s task was to spread ISIS ideology in the long term, and to
infiltrate society so deeply and lastingly that supporters would continue to exist, even if
territory was lost.
Olidort, Jacob. “Inside the Caliphate’s Classroom: Textbooks, Guidance Literature, and
Indoctrination Methods of the Islamic State.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/teaching-terror-the-islamicstates-textbooks-guidance-literature-and-indoct
Video and reporter’s summary of an address at a Policy Forum at The Washington
Institute by an expert of Salafism ideology and an expert of educational efforts across
the world. The speakers address ISIS’ need to educate those living in its areas of control
in order to indoctrinate and raise a “jihadi generation”.
INNOVATION

Rassler, Don. “Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones, and Supportive Technology.”
Combating Terrorism Center. October 20, 2016.
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https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/remotely-piloted-innovation-terrorism-drones-andsupportive-technology
In early October 2016, the Islamic State killed two Kurdish soldiers with an explosive
device hidden inside of a drone. Much has been made of the threat of terror use of
drones, but little empirical and historical work has been done to support our
understanding of this phenomenon and its evolution. This report seeks to address this
gap by providing a review of cases in which terrorist entities have either shown a
substantive interest in drones or have used them.
Knoll, David L. “How ISIS Endures By Innovating.” Foreign Affairs. September 30, 2016.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-30/how-isis-endures-innovating
ISIS’ novel techniques have been central to the group’s success, from up-armored
suicide vehicle improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) that penetrates well-defended
targets to ISIS’ brutality that keeps the media focused on the group. ISIS has both the
resources - in terms of money, military materiel, access to space, and time - and the
group attributes, such as an adaptive organizational structure and skilled, diverse
human capital that enable it to adopt innovative tactics.
Schechner, Sam., and Benoit Faucon. “New Tricks Make ISIS, Once Easily Tracked, A
Sophisticated Opponent.” Wall Street Journal. September 11, 2016.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-tricks-make-isis-once-easily-tracked-a-sophisticatedopponent-1473613106
ISIS’ communications, once easily tracked by authorities, have evolved into a mix of
encrypted chat-app messages, face-to-face meetings, written notes, and stretches of
silence and misdirection. These techniques help protect attackers from Western
intelligence agencies by leaving few electronic clues in a sea of intercepted data.
ATTACKS ABROAD: INSPIRED VS. DIRECTED
Watts, Clint. “Two-and-a-Half Years After ISIS’ Rise: Global Jihad Spreads and Morphs.”
Foreign Policy Research Institute. September 27, 2016. http://www.fpri.org/2016/09/2-12years-isis-rise-global-jihad-spreads-morphs/
A chart depicts the fractures of contemporary jihadist groups and their leanings towards al
Qaeda and ISIS.
UNITED STATES

Ax, Joseph. “Wolf Dens, Not Lone Wolves, the Norm in U.S. Islamic State Plots.” Reuters, June
14, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-islamic-state-crime-insightidUSKCN0Z015A
27 | P a g e

A review of nearly 90 IS court cases brought by the Department of Justice since 2014
found that three-quarters of those charged were alleged to be part of a group of
anywhere from two to more than 10 co-conspirators who met in person to discuss their
plans. Even in those cases that did not involve in-person meetings, defendants were
usually in contact with other sympathizers, via text message, email, or networking
websites. Fewer than 10 cases involved someone accused of acting alone. The “lone
wolf” image obscures the extent to which individuals become radicalized through
personal association with like-minded people, in what might be termed “wolf dens.”
Callimachi, Rukmini. “Was Orlando Shooter Really Acting for ISIS? For ISIS, It’s All the
Same.” New York Times, June 12, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-omar-mateen-isis.html
The attack in an Orlando nightclub that killed at least 49 people and wounded 53
highlights the blurring of the lines between ISIS-inspired and –directed attacks abroad.
The influencing of distant attackers to pledge allegiance to ISIS and then carry out mass
murder has become a core part of the group’s propaganda.
PRESENCE OUTSIDE OF ISIS CORE
Leigh, Karen., Jason French, and Jovi Juan. “Islamic State and Its Affiliates.” Wall Street
Journal. http://graphics.wsj.com/islamic-state-and-its-affiliates/
Several video compilations of the various ISIS-affiliated groups ranging from West Africa
to the Caucasus region highlight the widespread area of support to the group.
Watts, Clint. “When the Caliphate Crumbles: The Future of the Islamic State’s Affiliates.” War
on the Rocks. June 13, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/when-the-caliphatecrumbles-the-future-of-the-islamic-states-affiliates/
ISIS’ strongest affiliates in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula face stiff competition
from local rivals and rising counterterrorism pressure. The group’s endurance beyond
Iraq and Syria depends more on self-financing than on any other factor.
NORTH AFRICA

Chapin, Ellen. "Beyond the Caliphate: Morocco." CTC Sentinel, October 2017.
https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/01/CTC-Morocco.pdf.
The next issue of the Combating Terrorism Center’s look at the spread of ISIS focuses on
Morocco. ISIS itself has not launched any direct attacks, but 33 plotted attacks had been
linked to the group or inspired by it. Most of the planners of these attacks were
operating remotely from Syria and Iraq. Based on the report’s findings and the trends of
the attacks, Morocco risks suffering a similar series of attacks that Europe recently has.
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed., Jacob Zenn, and Nathaniel Barr. “Islamic State 2021: Possible
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Futures in North and West Africa.” Foundation for Defense of Democracies. February
2017.
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Rep
ort.pdf
It is possible that ISIS’ global decline could also paradoxically help the group in North
and West Africa, as state and non-state actors shift resources from battling ISIS to other
seemingly more urgent issues, giving the group the breathing room it needs to
regenerate. A forecast of ISIS activity in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, the Lake Chad region,
Mali, and Senegal is presented.
INDIA

Roul, Animesh. “How the Islamic State Gained Ground in India Using Indigenous Militant
Networks.” Jamestown Foundation. April 29, 2016.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45376&t
x_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=bed05adb57d4e88010f151f7f5d3cb5d
Leaders of India’s various militant groups pledged allegiance to ISIS in hope that they
could unite with one another against the Indian government. The militant groups have
employed several ISIS tactics, such as online recruitment, that have allowed for greater
influence among individuals.

TURKEY
Stein, Aaron. “The Islamic State in Turkey: A Deep Dive into a Dark Place.” War on the
Rocks. April 6, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-in-turkey-adeep-dive-into-a-dark-place
While European ISIS fighters have received considerable attention, Turkey faces risks
from its nationals transiting to and from Syria. The ISIS cell’s network, operations, and a
profile of its recruits in Turkey are spotlighted.
Kadercan, Burak. “How ISIS is Ripping Turkey Apart.” National Interest. June 30, 2016.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-isis-ripping-turkey-apart-16793
ISIS will continue to exploit Turkey’s critical vulnerabilities of political strife and ethnic
tensions in the country’s southeast. By not claiming responsibility for all attacks, ISIS
makes it possible for Ankara and the Kurds to blame one another, a dynamic
contributing to ethnic tensions across the country.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
For More Information on ISIS in the region, please see the CIWAG Southeast Asia reading list.

Edwards, Will. "ISIS' Reach Extends to Southeast Asia." Cipher Brief, August 20, 2017.
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/isis-reach-latches-southeast-asia.
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The ongoing siege of the Philippine city of Marawi, occupied by the ISIS affiliated Maute
and Abu Sayyaf groups, has called attention to the growing threat of ISIS affiliated
groups in Southeast Asia. Recently, a plot by ISIS-affiliated Jemaah Ansharut Daulah in
Indonesia attempted to conduct a chemical explosive attack in Jakarta was foiled and
showcased the encrypted messaging services groups are using to coordinate attacks. A
cooperative task force of Malaysian, Philippine, and Indonesian forces will start
operations against these groups.
Ness, Marielle. “Beyond the Caliphate: Southeast Asia.” CTC. June 2, 2017.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/beyond-the-caliphate-2
West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) series, Beyond the Caliphate, provides a
comprehensive look at ISIS affiliated groups operating beyond the central ISIS areas in
the Middle East. This entry looks at the militant groups operating out of Southeast Asia
that have pledged to ISIS, including the Maute group that recently invaded and seized
Marawi.
PHILIPPINES
For More Information on ISIS in the Philippines, please see the CIWAG Southeast Asia reading list.

"The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism." Counter Extremism Project. February 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/philippines.
This report from the Counter Extremism Project is an in-depth overview of extremist
groups and counterinsurgency operations within the Philippines. Since the turn of the
century, the Philippines have been in constant strife with Communist Rebel separatist
groups and Islamic extremist groups that have participated in bombings, kidnappings,
organized criminal activity, and guerilla tactics against government forces. In the last
few years, since the rise of the Islamic State and globalization of extremist ideologies,
the Philippine government has been forced to face an emboldened and stronger
insurgency presence that has captivated much of Southeast Asia.
"Military Sees ISIS-inspired Turaife Group as Major Threat." Phil Star, December 15, 2017.
https://beta.philstar.com/headlines/2017/12/15/1768672/military-sees-isis-inspiredturaife-group-major-threat.
Esmail Abdulmalik, who goes by the name Abu Turaife, could be selected to take over as
the lead ISIS commander in the Philippines. After the defeat of the Maute group and the
death of Isnilon Hapilon, the self-styled Turaife group, though few in number, has
already been suspected of planning several bombings and has the potential to become a
serious threat in the region.
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Sarmiento, Bong S. "Islamic State Lurks in Philippine Shadows." Asia Times, November 7, 2017.
http://www.atimes.com/article/islamic-state-lurks-philippine-shadows/.
Despite the siege of Marawi being over and the deaths of former Abu Sayyaf leader
Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute of the Maute Group, there is still a serious militant
threat in the Philippines. Amin Baco, a bomb-maker who is affiliated with Jemaah
Islamiyah, is believed to be next in line to take over for Isnilon Hapilon and Puruji
Indama, another Abu Sayyaf leader, is believed to be planning new attacks. There are at
least four ISIS affiliated groups operating in the Philippines, though several are
numerically diminished after losses in Marawi, they still pose a serious threat.
Kugelman, Michael. “Filipino ISIS ‘Not a Rag-Tag Group of Rebels.’ Cipher Brief, October 5, 2017.
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/filipino-isis-not-rag-tag-grouprebels?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=2fecf5ef03TCB+October+5+2017&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-2fecf5ef03122455129
The actions and tactics of the ISIS affiliated groups caught the Philippine government by
surprise due to their different tactics and technological advancements compared to
other regional insurgent groups. Normal counterterrorism efforts dealt with groups
using small arms and operating out of remote bases in the jungles and rural areas.
Urban warfare against a highly organized group that uses drones for reconnaissance and
encrypted messaging apps to coordinate attacks was a departure from past operations.
The responding actions by the military against the group may serve as propaganda for
recruits and analysts believe that ISIS backed groups have found a fertile area to grow in
the Philippines and will be a problem for some time.
Winter, Charlie. “Has the Islamic State Abandoned Its Provincial Model in the Philippines?”
War on the Rocks. July 22, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/has-the-islamicstate-abandoned-its-provincial-model-in-the-philippines/
In an ISIS propaganda video entitled “Structure of the Khilafah,” the group zooms in on
the technicalities behind ISIS’ provinces, yet fails to mention any of the areas where ISIS
claims to be present but hasn’t established provincial affiliates, like Somalia, Indonesia,
Tunisia, and the Philippines. Its expansion methodology seems to have changed: no
longer is a simply loyalty announcement enough to prompt the caliphal leadership to
upgrade an overseas organization from fan group to formalized province.
BANGLADESH

Roul, Animesh. “How Bangladesh Became Fertile Ground for al-Qa’ida and the Islamic
State.” CTC Sentinel 9, No. 5. May 25, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/howbangladesh-became-fertile-ground-for-al-qaida-and-the-islamic-state
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Despite government denials, both al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State has taken advantage
of an upsurge in Islamist militancy in Bangladesh over anger at the execution of Islamist
political leaders in 2013, and both hope to expand their footprint there by building
alliances with local groups. Bangladeshi police suspect the Bangladeshi wing of al-Qa’ida
in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which has claimed a series of attacks on secular
bloggers, is liaising with top leadership of the terrorist network in Pakistan. An
increasingly assertive, local chapter of the Islamic State has launched attacks on
foreigners and sectarian targets in a bid to build its support base in the country.
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ARMED GROUPS
AL-QAEDA

Monnier, Oliver. "Islamic State, al-Qaeda Support Fuels Attacks in West
Africa." Bloomberg Politics, February 5, 2018.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-05/islamic-state-al-qaedasupport-fuels-attacks-in-west-africa.
ISIS and al-Qaeda are cooperating in Western Africa to support local militant groups
carrying out attacks against government forces in Mali, Nigeria, and along the southern
Sahara. Islamic militant groups in Mali are using sophisticated tactics and advanced
explosive devices that requires expertise that the groups previously didn’t have.
Zenn, Jacob. "The Al-Qaeda Accelerant in Boko Haram’s Rise." U.S. Naval War College Center On
Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups. June 2017.
https://usnwc.edu/Publications/Reports-and-Studies/CIWAG-Case-Studies.
Jacob Zenn’s case study, maps Boko Haram’s many factions, loyalties, splinterings, and
re-formations. Zenn supplies deep insight into the seams and gaps that exist, and how
strategic and tactical motivations have propelled an armed group to regional
importance. He also dissects how the group’s evolution has taken place under the
watchful eye, and often directing hand, of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq
and al-Sham and highlights its starring role in a new international rivalry: the uncivil war
between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Gaffey, Conor. "U.S. PEACE CORPS EVACUATED AS AL-QAEDA, ISIS THREAT GROWS IN BURKINA
FASO." Newsweek, September 5, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/peace-corpsburkina-faso-al-qaeda-isis-659462.
The U.S. Peace Corps recently evacuated its volunteers in Burkina Faso due to growing
security threats. Recent attacks in the capital and the growing presence of Al-Qaeda
affiliated groups and an ISIS affiliated group have put the safety of the volunteers at risk.
Several AQ associated groups merged under the leadership of former Ansar Dine
leader, Lyad Ag Ghaly and former AQ adherent, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi has taken
charge of the local ISIS affiliate. With the recent attacks and concentration of several
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groups, Marc Christian Kabore, the President of Burkina Faso, acknowledged that the
country is facing a long-term fight against terrorism.
Malik, Shiv; Ali Younes, Spencer Ackerman and Mustafa Khalili. “How ISIS crippled al-Qaida.”
Guardian, June 10, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/how-isiscrippled-al-qaida
The inside story of the coup that has brought the world’s most feared terrorist network
to the brink of collapse. IS has not simply eclipsed AQ on the battlefields of Syria and
Iraq, and in the competition for funding and new recruits. According to a series of
exclusive interviews with senior jihadi ideologues, IS has successfully launched “a coup”
against AQ to destroy it from within. As a consequence, they now admit, AQ – as an idea
and an organization – is now on the verge of collapse.
AL-SHABAAB

Warner, Jason, and Caleb Weiss. "A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between alShabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia." CTC Sentinel10, no. 10 (November 2017).
https://ctc.usma.edu/a-legitimate-challenger-assessing-the-rivalry-between-al-shabaaband-the-islamic-state-in-somalia/.
A faction of al-Shabaab operating out of Puntland in northeastern Somalia split from the
traditionally AQ aligned group in 2015 and pledged to ISIS. Al-Shabaab has worked to
purge any internal sympathies for ISIS from its ranks and has attacked the ISIS affiliated
faction. This report evaluates the growing faction and sees if it poses a significant threat
to al-Shabaab and the region.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLAMIST GROUPS

“Islamic State Philippines (ISP, ISISP)-Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).” TRAC, 2016.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-state-philippines-isp-abu-sayyafgroup-asg
Four different groups have pledged their allegiance to ISIS in the Philippines. Isnilon
Hapilon’s Basilan based faction of Abu Sayaff Group (ASG), a faction of the Bansamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Maute Group, and the Ansarul Kilafah Phillippines.
This piece provides a brief distinction between the ASG faction that support ISIS and the
faction that supports AQ and provide several videos on the groups allegiance to IS along
with a list of arrested members, past leaders, areas of operations and photos of the
group. The Ansarul Kilafah is a group that splintered off from the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) when the main group entered into a peace deal with the
government and BIFF was the armed wing that split during the peace process as well.
ORGANIZED CRIME

Nadeau, Barbie Latza. "The Italian Mob Is Peddling Pills to ISIS." Daily Beast, February 3, 2018.
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-italian-mob-is-peddling-pills-to-isis.
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Italy’s Calabrian mafia is selling opioids such as tramadol to extremist groups Boko
Haram and ISIS. Tramadol when mixed with caffeine is an amphetamine, erasing fear,
pain, and fatigue on the battlefield. The Italian port of Gioia Tauro is where over $1
million of trafficked materials is moved daily. It is estimated that 80 percent of cocaine
from Columbia in Europe is trafficked by the mafia.
CONTROLLED COMMUNICATIONS
Harris, Shane and Shachtman, Noah. “ISIS Keeps Getting Better at Dodging U.S. Spies.” Daily
Beast. November 14, 2014. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/13/isiskeeps-getting-better-at-dodging-u-s-spies.html
This article describes the difficulties the U.S. faces in tracking IS members and
movements and the steps taken by IS to keep their communications from being
intercepted. Without having actual intelligence operatives on the ground in the area,
the U.S. is forced to rely on whatever communications they can intercept and aerial
surveillance. IS enforces a strict code of discipline amongst its members in order to get
them to follow certain procedures for their communications including encryption,
disabling any form of geotagging, and only utilizing approved messaging services that
delete messages after they are received.

ISLAMIC STATE – INFORMATION OPERATIONS:
PROPAGANDA
Winter, Charlie. "Totalitarian Insurgency: Evaluating the Islamic State's In-Theater Propaganda
Operations." Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups Case Studies, April 2017.
http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/15/.
Charlie Winter examines the in-theater propaganda strategies of the Islamic State in Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS). Although much attention has rightly been paid to their online
recruiting and social media campaigns, their in-theater strategies are equally compelling
and strategically targeted. As ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to inspire and sponsor new
franchises around the globe, the issue of how to control access to counter-narratives
becomes more urgent; this first look at in-theater strategies provides the basis for
further research and investigation into the competition for ideas and influence.
Milton, Daniel. “Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts.”
Combating Terrorism Center. October 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf
This report breaks down the Islamic State’s media activities through a two-fold
approach. First, it examines a small number of declassified documents captured from
the group’s predecessors to provide a baseline understanding its present-day media
operations. Second, through an examination of over 9,000 Islamic State official media
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products, this report offers detailed insight into what the group is saying and what a
study of its propaganda can tell us about its strengths, weaknesses, and struggles.
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed., Nathaniel Barr, and Bridget Moreng. “The Islamic State’s Global
Propaganda Strategy.” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. March
31, 2016. https://icct.nl/publication/the-islamic-states-global-propaganda-strategy/
This research paper aims to analyze in depth the global propaganda strategy of ISIS by
looking at the methods through which this grand strategy is carried out as well as the
objectives that ISIS wants to achieve through it. Included are ISIS’ growth model;
narratives and themes used by the group; the deployment of these narratives; direct
engagement strategy; and policy options to counter ISIS’ global propaganda efforts.
Winter, Charlie. “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding ISIL’s Propaganda Strategy.” Quilliam
Foundation. July, 2015. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-statespropaganda-strategy.pdf
This report is a detailed study that analyzes how IS has revolutionized jihadist
propaganda. It lays out six themes used by the group: brutality, mercy, victimhood, war,
belonging, and utopianism. The report also discusses how IS propaganda is carefully
designed to excite followers and outrage most Westerners.
SOCIAL MEDIA
Katz, Rita. “Follow ISIS on Twitter: A Special Report on the Use of Social Media by Jihadists.”
INSITE on Terrorism & Extremism (blog), June 26, 2014.
http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/192-follow-isis-on-twitter-aspecial-report-on-the-use-of-social-media-by-jihadists
IS has become adept at utilizing social media, especially Twitter, in order to spread
propaganda, recruit new followers, and conduct psychological warfare. In addition to a
plethora of unofficial accounts, IS has several dedicated accounts and an entire media
wing called Al-Furqan. The readily available and easy to use platform of social media has
greatly allowed the terror group and others like it to spread their message and garner
support.
SPREADING THE APOCALYPTICAL MESSAGE THROUGH AN INFORMATION FLOOD

Berger, J.M. “The Metronome of Apocalyptic Time: Social Media as Carrier Wave for
Millenarian Contagion.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August, 2015): 61-71.
Terrorism Research Initiative.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/444/875
This Islamic State firmly believes in not only the creation of a perfect society, but in the
creation of the perfect society to bring on the end of the world and the final battle
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between Muslims and all non-Muslims. In order to create a heightened sense of
urgency that this day is rapidly approaching (and in turn garner more recruits) IS uses
social media at a rapid pace. While IS uses all available social media platforms, Twitter
so far has been their most utilized one. They flood the internet with countless tweets
espousing their message and usually before or after any event or attack, their rhetoric
increases rapidly. An individual who follows IS on Twitter or other social media
platforms is exposed to countless pieces of propaganda over and over again from a not
only the user they follow but all of their followers/contacts. This immersion tactic is
paired with social contagion, and temporal compression in order to spread their
apocalyptical message in a countdown-like manner and pushed already immersed users
to hurry up and join while there is still time.
DEPTH OF CONTENT

Zelin, Aaron Y. “Picture or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media
Output.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August, 2015):85-97. Terrorism Research
Initiative. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445/876
The article covers a study that was conducted consisting of tracking, examining and
analyzing a week’s worth of IS official media releases. Normally, mainstream media only
will report on any execution videos or major threats that are released but there is a
much wider range of content that is actually released. The majority of social media
output covers military activities, trainings and attacks, governance, preaching, moral
policing and morality, and a variety of other themes. The study also revealed that they
tend to rely on imagery more than lengthy text posts. A multitude of quick pictures with
captions can carry an inundating message to their followers and potential recruits.
MEDIA PRODUCTIONS
MESSAGING STRATEGY

Winter, Charlie. “Islamic State Propaganda: Key Elements of the Group’s Messaging. “Terrorism
Monitor 13, no. 12 (June 12, 2015.) Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44030&tx_ttnews%5Bb
ackPid%5D=228&cHash=ee301073a70496485bd622db9e2326dd#.VYAfRflVikp
Following IS’s lightning-fast expansion in the Middle East and beyond, rarely a day
passes without it securing a place in the headlines. This is the inevitable outcome of the
group's well-honed messaging strategy, which skillfully uses social media to project
propaganda globally. By dissecting and examining the various strands of the group's
propaganda, narrative and brand, this article deals with the message itself, focusing on
how the "Islamic State" has gained its international traction.
VIDEO AND MEDIA STYLE/PRODUCTION

Rose, Steve. “The Isis Propaganda War: a Hi-Tech Media Jihad.” Guardian, October 7, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/07/isis-media-machine-propaganda-war\
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IS propaganda videos are often produced at professional-level quality and borrow from
popular movies, TV shows, news programs, video games and even internet memes.
They have altered style of their media productions in an attempt to appeal to a wider
and younger audience. However, their media productions, attempting to intimidate or
inspire, have backfired on them by bringing actions against them after a release of an
execution video. The various programs designed to combat IS propaganda are discussed
with a focus on the U.S. State Department’s Twitter program of Think Again Turn Away.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Winter, Charlie. “Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare.”
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. February 13,
2017. http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Media-jihad_web.pdf
This research paper presents new, empirical insight into how ISIS transformed its
strategic trajectory in the weeks after its capture of Mosul in 2014. Comprising the
translation and analysis of a 55-page document compiled and published by ISIS in 2016,
it offers a unique window into the mindset of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s propagandists.
Ingram, Haroro J. “Three Traits of the Islamic State's Information Warfare.” RUSI Journal 159,
no. 6 (2014): 4-11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2014.990810
The author of this piece analyses the three traits of IS’s media propaganda. The traits
identified from analyses of primary sources are: “the use of a multidimensional, multiplatform approach that simultaneously targets ‘friends and foes’ to enhance the reach,
relevance and resonance of its message; the synchronization of narrative and action to
maximize operational and strategic ‘effects’ in the field; and the centrality of the Islamic
State ‘brand’ to its entire campaign.”
--------“The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations.” Australian Journal of
International Affairs (2015):1-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1059799
This study utilizes both English and Arabic communiqués produced by IS media units and
individual wilayat information officers to analyze IS’s information operations. The main
goal of their IO is to gather support by simultaneously trying to appeal to people’s desire
for security, stability and a livelihood and also preach its political and military actions.
Supporting this, they conduct a constant campaign of denigrating any groups that speak
out against it or are contrary to its belief system. The tactics are described as “baiting,”
messages intended to provoke disproportionate responses and then use the responses
against them. One example provided was that when they were critiqued for burning
alive the Jordanian pilot, IS said in response that children were burned alive and buried
by airstrikes so therefore their actions were “just” and the “crusaders” were the real
enemy. IS then goes on to promote itself as the champion of Sunni Muslims and justify
its actions by rationalizing and comparing it to the actions conducted by its opponents.
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HEARTS AND MINDS
Zelin, Aaron. “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Has a Consumer Protection Office.” Atlantic.
June 13, 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-isisguide-to-building-an-islamic-state/372769/
This article describes how IS seeks to control every aspect of life in the areas that it has
captured. These are often promoted by the group as ways for the inhabitants to live a
better life. This is however part of a greater strategy of governance by IS, where they
also have social services religious lectures, billboard campaigns, and a functioning sharia
courts system. They also have a consumer protection office, fix roads, restore electricity,
and establish food kitchens and orphanages. It is important to the group’s propaganda
and recruitment efforts that it presents the image of being a functioning state to divert
attention away from its normal campaign of terror.
DABIQ- THE ISLAMIC STATE’S MAGAZINE
Ryan, Michael W. S. “Hot Issue: Dabiq: What Islamic State’s New Magazine Tells us about Their
Strategic Direction, Recruitment Patterns and Guerrilla Doctrine.” Terrorism Monitor,
Jamestown Foundation. August 1, 2014.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42702&c
Hash=0efbd71af77fb92c064b9403dc8ea838%22%20%5Cl%20%22.U-JY7FYkhZg
This article covers the official magazine of IS titled Dabiq. This magazine is published in
several languages, including English, and is designed to chronicle the IS, focusing on its
military operations, demonizing its enemies, justifying its existence and utilizing Islamic
literature. The name Dabiq comes from the name of an area north of Aleppo which is
featured in the events of the Malahim (apocalypse) where the final battle against the
“Crusaders” will take place. The magazine goes beyond propaganda and provides
records of tribal meetings and advice on information for foreigners who wish to join IS.

RECRUITMENT & FOREIGN FIGHTERS:
ORIGINS OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Del Nero, Serena, Marco Mezzadra, Claudia Pazzaglia, Allesandro Riva, and Allesandro Zotta.
"On Their Way: The Journey of Foreign Fighters." Density Design Labs. 2017.
https://www.informationisbeautifulawards.com/showcase/2323.
This graphical representation of the origins and total amount of ISIS foreign fighters also
shows the amount of returnees per country of origin. Tunisia, Turkey, France, Germany
and the U.K had the most returnees.
Witte, Griff., Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley. “Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as
Islamic State Loses Its Edge.” Washington Post, September 9, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-of-foreign-fighters-plummets-asisis-loses-its-edge/2016/09/09/ed3e0dda-751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html
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From a peak of 2,000 foreign recruits crossing the Turkey-Syria border each month, ISIL
and other extremist groups operating in Syria are down to as few as 50, according to
U.S. intelligence assessments. The diminished flows raise questions about whether the
terrorism threat is actually easing or just morphing into a more dangerous new phase.
Fritz, Jason. “Island in the Foreign Fighter Stream: Trinidad’s Extremism Problem.” War on the
Rocks. May 4, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/islands-in-the-foreign-fighterstream-trinidads-extremism-problem/
Trinidad and Tobago is ranked in the top 15 per capita supplier of foreign fighters to
Syria and Iraq, by far the greatest supplier in the Western Hemisphere. An examination
of the socioeconomic conditions mobilizing Trinidadians highlights the challenges in
addressing the eastern Caribbean as a hub for radicalization.
“The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the EU – Profiles, Threats & Policies.” International
Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. April 1, 2016.
https://icct.nl/publication/report-the-foreign-fighters-phenomenon-in-the-eu-profilesthreats-policies/
The gap in knowledge of the EU’s foreign fighter phenomenon is addressed by analyzing
not only the numbers and characteristics of foreign fighters across the EU, but also how
the Union and Member States assess the threat of foreign fighters as well as their policy
responses regarding security, preventive, and legislative measures. The report also
outlines a series of policy options aimed both at the EU and its Member States.
“Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” Washington Post, October 11, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreign-fighters-flow-tosyria/2014/10/11/3d2549fa-5195-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_graphic.html
This news article features a highly detailed graphic showing the number and locations of
foreign fighters (as of October 2014) who have travelled to Syria to fight for IS. The
highest numbers have come from Saudi Arabia and Northern Africa but Russia, the U.K.
and Belgium have seen significant numbers travel as well.
RECRUITING TACTICS
Bouzar, Dounia, and Carol Rollie Flynn. "ISIS Recruiting: It’s Not (Just) Ideological." Foreign
Policy Research Institute. September 5, 2017 https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/09/isisrecruiting-not-just-ideological/?utm_source=FPRI+EMails&utm_campaign=e7221a904d-In+the+Spotlight++Flynn+Bouzar+09082017&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e8d0f13be2e7221a904d-179135617.
The different methods utilized by ISIS online recruiters are particular designed and
directed towards individuals that exhibit certain behaviors. These behaviors make them
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more susceptible different messages in a “targeted advertising” approach to
radicalization. The researchers identify and present the seven different narratives used
by ISIS recruiters and who they typically target with them.
Rosenblatt, Nate. “All Jihad is Local: What ISIS’ Files Tell Us About Its Fighters.” New America.
July 2016. https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/ISIS-Files.pdf
A collection of infographics visualizes the personal information of 3,500 foreign fighters
to identify their subnational origins and the rough typologies of who they are.
Mohd Sani, Moh Azizuddin. "ISIS Recruitment of Malaysian Youth: Challenge and Response."
Middle East Institute. May 3, 2016. http://www.mei.edu/content/map/isis-recruitmentmalaysian-youth-challenge-and-response.
In 2015 and 2016 the Malaysia arrested more than 160 people suspected of having ties
to ISIS. With the rapid global growth of the Islamic State since 2013, the Malaysian
government-a state with a Muslim majority population-has become increasingly vigilant
about removing extremist propaganda and launching public education campaigns aimed
at preventing radicalization. ISIS’ main target is the disenchanted impressionable youth
of Malaysia. As with many other countries, ISIS had seen success recruiting young
Muslims through social media campaigns and community outreach. The daunting
challenge for the Malaysian Police and regional counter-terrorism outfits is preventing
ISIS from indoctrinating citizens before they have further conflict.
Dodwell, Brian., Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler. “The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside
Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail.” Combating Terrorism Center at
West Point. April 18, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-globalworkforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail
This report contains an analysis of over 4,000 unique Islamic State personnel records. It
is the largest collection of primary source documentation from the Islamic State to date.
These documents were acquired from an Islamic State defector and provide a look into
the organization’s workforce. The report reveals information about foreign fighters’
citizenship, points of entry into Syria, personal information, previous occupations,
education levels, religious preference and knowledge level, fighting role in the group,
and previous jihadist experience.
Gates, Scott., and Sukanya Podder. “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic
State.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August, 2015):107-116. Terrorism Research
Center. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/446/877
The Islamic State actively recruits foreign fighters and they in turn make up a significant
part of IS (20,000 foreign fighters based on recent reports). Different recruitment
techniques are utilized with social media and online recruitment strategies. The media
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wing of IS is adept at creating a message that appeals to younger generations and taps
into and preys upon their insecurities and desire for a belonging and identity. The
foreign fighters and local fighters have different patterns and motivations for joining IS
and while normally this would cause some strife within the organization, they are able
to manage the mix of recruits so far.
AMERICAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander, Seamus Hughes, and Bennet Clifford. "The Travelers: American
Jihadists in Syria and Iraq." George Washington University Program on Extremism.
February 2018.
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/TravelersAmericanJihadistsi
nSyriaandIraq.pdf.
This study from GWU is a comprehensive analysis of Americans who became foreign
fighters for militant groups in Syria and Iraq since 2011. The report identifies 64
Americans and uncovers their motivations, methods, travel patterns, and demographics.
PRIOR EUROPEAN NETWORKS
Holman, Timothy. “Belgian and French Foreign Fighters in Iraq 2003-2005: A Comparative
Case Study. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:8, 607-609, DOI:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1038105. 605-609.
This excerpt examines the origins of the 19th Network in Paris, France and the Kari
Network in Brussels, Belgium during the early years of the Iraq War. The primary activity
of the 19th Network, which included Cherif Kouachi of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks,
was foreign fighter related. The article discusses the Kari Network’s involvement in illicit
financing to send individuals to Iraq and bring them back to Belgium.
CURRENT EUROPEAN NETWORKS
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Nathaniel Barr. “Recent Attacks Illuminate the Islamic State’s
Europe Attack Network.” Jamestown Foundation. April 27, 2016.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45362&no_cache=1
ISIS’ successes are a result of the structure of its shadowy external operations branch,
the Amn al-Kharji, responsible for selecting and training operatives for attacks outside of
ISIS’ core territory.
Faiola, Anthony., and Souad Mekhennet. “Tracing the Path of Four Terrorists Sent to Europe by
the Islamic State.” Washington Post. April 22, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-europes-migrantcrisis-became-an-opportunity-for-isis/2016/04/21/ec8a7231-062d-4185-bb27cc7295d35415_story.html
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Posing as war-weary Syrians in October 2015, four men embedded with nearly 200
migrants arrived on the Greek island of Leros. Two of them would participate in the
Paris attacks. Their story offers a cautionary tale for a continent facing its worst security
threat since the end of the Cold War.
BELGIUM

Van Vlierden, Guy. “The Zerkani Network: Belgium’s Most Dangerous Jihadist Group.”
Jamestown Foundation. April 12, 2016.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45305&no_cache=1
Belgium’s Zerkani network, led by an enigmatic Moroccan, has sent at least 59 recruits
to Syria and Iraq, with several returning to commit the deadly Paris and Brussels attacks.
Its modus operandi differs greatly from that of Shariah4Belgium, the infamous group
fueling the high number of Belgian jihadists, yet connections between the networks are
undoubtedly present.
GERMANY

Heil, Georg. “The Berlin Attack and the ‘Abu Walaa’ Islamic State Recruitment Network.” CTC
Sentinel. February 22, 2017. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-berlin-attack-andthe-abu-walaa-islamic-state-recruitment-network
The Berlin truck attack in December 2016 exposed the danger posed by a radical
network that Anis Amri belonged to in northwestern Germany. The network, led by Iraqi
preacher Abu Walaa, is believed to have recruited dozens to travel to join ISIS,
communicated extensively with operatives in Syria and Iraq, and encouraged attacks on
German soil.
Staudenmaier, Rebecca. "Berlin to bring back children of German 'Islamic State' fighters —
report." Deutsche Welle, November 23, 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/berlin-to-bringback-children-of-german-islamic-state-fighters-report/a-41501060.
Germany is negotiating with the Iraqi government for the release of mothers and their
children who have German citizenship from a detention center outside Mosul. There are
believed to be 1,300 women and children in this detention center including children
who were born in ISIS held territory. German security services are not concerned with
the return of younger children since they will be more traumatized than radicalized,
older children however are more likely to have been indoctrinated and could pose a
threat.
EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander., and Seamus Hughes. “The Threat to the United States from
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the Islamic State’s Virtual Entrepreneurs.” CTC Sentinel. March 9, 2017.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-threat-to-the-united-states-from-the-islamicstates-virtual-entrepreneurs
Among the most recent evolutions of jihadist terrorist tactics in the West has been the
rise of the virtual entrepreneur. In the U.S., there are 14 known cases of terroristrelated activity involving 19 U.S.-based individuals where the involvement of an ISIS
virtual entrepreneur has been documented. This outsourcing of terrorism has been a
game change in ISIS efforts to attack the West.
Callimachi, Rukmini. “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots
From Afar.” New York Times. February 4, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html
While the trail of many ISIS plots led back to planners living in Syria, the very nature of
the group’s method of remote plotting means there is little dependence on its
maintaining a safe haven there or in Iraq. Close examination of both successful and
unsuccessful plots carried out in ISIS’ name over the past three years indicates that such
enabled attacks are making up a growing share of the operations of the group.
FORMERS AND DEFECTORS
Callimachi, Rukmini. “How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers.” New
York Times, August 3, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-recruitinterview.html?_r=0
From his prison cell, a German foreign fighter explains how ISIS recruited him to return
to Germany to prepare attacks. This revelation sheds light on how ISIS grew its brand of
global jihad and perpetrated attacks across Europe.
Giglio, Mike., and Muzer al-Awad. “How to Lose Your Mind to ISIS and Then Fight to Get It
Back.” Buzzfeed. April 13, 2016. https://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/how-to-loseyour-mind-to-isis-and-then-fight-to-get-it-back
It’s far easier to join ISIS than to leave. Members of a hidden community of ISIS
defectors recount how they were pulled into a grip of extremism – and then struggle to
escape.
Weiss, Michael. “I Was an ISIS Jihadist – Until They Arrested and Tortured Me.” Daily Beast.
July 22, 2016. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/07/22/i-was-an-isis-jihadistuntil-they-arrested-and-tortured-me.html
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The detailed accounts of an ISIS defector describe his time inside the world’s most
notorious terrorist organization. His account is a useful insight into how the organization
has grown from a shrewd guerrilla insurgency into a totalitarian quasi-state.
RADICALIZATION PROCESS
Hughes, Seamus. “To Stop ISIS Recruitment, Focus Offline.” Lawfare. August 7, 2016.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/stop-isis-recruitment-focus-offline
This article argues that even though ISIL has perfected the use of the Internet to
radicalize and recruit followers, it is still necessary to stop in-person contact to stop
terrorist recruitment.
Bisserbe, Noemie. “European Prisons Fueling Spread of Islamic Radicalism.” Wall Street Journal.
July 31, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/european-prisons-fueling-spread-of-islamicradicalism-1470001491
The rise of ISIS caught Europe’s prison systems off guard. Many inmates use jail time to
forge ties with petty criminals from the predominantly Muslim suburbs that ring
European cities, grooming them for attacks at home or abroad. Prison officials are faced
with a difficult choice of absorbing hardened militants into the general prison
population or concentrating them in special wards.
Shane, Scott. “The Enduring Influence of Anwar Al-Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State.”
CTC Sentinel 9 No. 7. July 27, 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss73.pdf
Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al Awlaki’s influence continues to live on in the ISIL era.
Despite his long association with al Qaeda, al Awlaki has been embraced by ISIL, and he
continues to inspire terrorism from beyond the grave.
RETURNING FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Meko, Time. "Now that the Islamic State has Fallen in Iraq and Syria, Where are all its Fighters
Going?" Washington Post, February 22, 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/.
As the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria dwindles to its last remaining strongholds, nearly
40,000 of its foreign fighters are leaving the region. This article illustrates where their
fighters are migrating to, and what problems these fighters might cause as they return
to society.
Rayner, Gordan. "Half of British Islamic State Fighters are Unaccounted for." Brisbane Times,
January 6, 2018. https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/world/half-of-british-islamic-statefighters-are-unaccounted-for-20180106-h0eehx.html.
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As ISIS loses territory and control in Iraq and Syria, around half of the estimated 850
British jihadists who went to the Middle East are unaccounted for. Fifteen to 20 percent
are presumed killed in the fighting, and others are suspected of fleeing to Turkey and
other neighboring states as ISIS continues to crumble.
Perraudin, Frances. "Briton Jailed for 10 Years for Joining Islamic State." The Guardian,
December 8, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/08/britonmohammed-abdallah-jailed-for-10-years-for-joining-islamic-state.
Mohammed Abdullah was convicted of being of member of a terrorist organization and
receiving funds and weapons for the group. He has been sentenced to ten years in
prison though he claims to have only traveled to Syria to deliver money to the poor and
that someone else must have pledged him to ISIS. Abdullah has a history of fighting in
militant groups, having left England previously to fight with the Tripoli Brigade in Libya
against Gaddafi in 2011.
Uzielli, Julian, Samira Mohyeddin, and Anne Pennman. "What Should Canada Do With Foreign
Fighters Who Return Home?" CBC Radio. November 27, 2017.
http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-november-27-20171.4418695/what-should-canada-do-with-foreign-fighters-who-return-home-1.4418722.
As ISIS loses its territory in the Middle East, foreign fighters have been returning to their
respective countries of origin and each country has different policies in place on how to
deal with this. Canada is in the process of deciding what to do with the 60 confirmed
returned foreign fighters. Concern over the scope of monitoring every person who has
returned is balanced against focusing on preventing internal radicalization of Canadians
who never left, claiming that returnees were more apt to be disillusioned and less likely
to conduct an attack.

ISLAMIC STATE – FINANCIAL OPERATIONS:
OVERVIEW OF IS FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
Ismay, John, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, and C.J. Chivers. "How ISIS Produced Its Cruel Arsenal on an
Industrial Scale." New York Times, December 10, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/world/middleeast/isisbombs.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=first-column-region.
ISIS was frequently innovative in regards to the manufacture of its own weapons and
explosives. As ISIS was pushed out of its holdings in Iraq and Syria, coalition forces found
a highly organized, industrial level of production of explosives and rockets. The terror
group had created its own explosive formulae, modifying existing ones to make them
easier to detonate. The devices ranged from improvised chemical warheads, to
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landmines and IED’s, rockets and explosive packed space heaters designed to target
civilians.
“Cash To Chaos: Dismantling ISIS’ Financial Infrastructure.” House Homeland Security Committee
Majority Staff Report. October, 2016. https://homeland.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/Dismantling-ISIS-Financial-Infrastructure.pdf
Despite territorial losses, ISIL maintains revenue streams from a portfolio of illicit
activities. This report highlights ISIL’s financial infrastructure from areas including black
market oil and gas; black market commodities; antiquities; extortion, taxation, and
robbery; kidnapping; Gulf State support; and emerging fundraising tactics.
Hansen-Lewis, Jamie, and Jacob N. Shapiro. “Understanding the Daesh Economy.” Perspectives
on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August, 2015):142-155. Terrorism Research Initiative.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/450/881
This article evaluates the sustainability of IS’s economy. While the terrorist group
manages to bring in a large amount of revenue each year, the article shows that it is not
sustainable over a long period of time. The majority of IS income, besides the oil sales is
dependent on extortion, ransom money, and forced taxation. The group touts in its
propaganda videos its infrastructure and social services, yet the reality of the situation is
reflected in the poor health of the inhabitants under its rule. The economy itself has
little potential to grow, and it entirely based off of limited sources of funding that will
provide a big boost in the near future, but will run out over time. The authors conclude
that containment seems a viable strategy for combatting IS because it was run out of
funds and resources and fall apart from within.
Espostio, William., Lenhard, April, Doyle, Harrison. “Funding ISIS: The Business of Terror.”
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security 20, no. 4 (2014): 14-17.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=99956290&site=ehos
t-live
This journal article describes the finances of IS and the methods and tactics used to
acquire them. It describes and evaluates the different sources used to fund the terrorist
organization and also looks at how IS grew from a small militant group to a bigger threat
than AQ.
OIL AS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF FUNDS
Prepared by Minority Staff for Ranking Member Lisa Murkowski. “A Dark Pool in the Mideast:
The Problem of ISIS Oil Sales.” U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
September 24, 2014.
http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=005f682a-cc3f4bd2-91b6-d68e0527439d
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This research shows that oil is the biggest source of revenue for IS and that the total
amount of production and revenue it not fully tracked even by IS itself. It is believed
that ISIS controls 60% of Syria’s oil production and their total revenue can be up to $100
million per month. Depriving IS of its access to oil would be a major detriment to the
group.
CRIME, EXTORTION, KIDNAPPING AND SMUGGLING AS FUNDING SOURCES
Seftel, Bennett. "With Coffers Draining, ISIS May Seek Donations & Step Up Crime." Cipher Brief,
October 27, 2017. https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/coffersdraining-isis-may-seek-donations-step-crime.
As ISIS loses more territory, its access to oil, protection money/taxes, stolen antiquities
and other forms of revenue are rapidly dwindling. While ISIS can still bring in close to $4
million a month in oil sales they have greatly expanded their sales of illicit goods to
make up for areas of lost revenue. The recently created Terrorist Financing Targeting
Center has worked to sanction several members of ISIS and its affiliates that manage the
terror group’s financing.
Shelley, Louise. “Blood Money: How ISIS Makes Bank.” Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign
Relations. November 30, 2014.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142403/louise-shelley/blood-money
This article identifies and describes the additional funding sources besides oil that IS
uses. The usual terror finance acquisition tactics of smuggling, kidnapping, theft, and
extortion are utilized. The sale of smuggled cigarette and cell phones provides steady
revenue but also the illegal sale of stolen antiquities and taxes upon any non-IS sales of
antiquities. Members sell their passports before leaving Turkey to enter Syria and
donations from other sources also attribute to IS’s coffers.
ISLAMIC STATE BANKING
Levitt, Matthew. “The Islamic State’s Backdoor Banking.” Policywatch 2390, Washington
Institute for
Near East Policy. March 24, 2015. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/the-islamic-states-backdoor-banking
This article describes the difficulties in attacking the banking of IS due to their nonconventional means of transferring money. One such scheme involves donors
purchasing pre-paid cards and showing the card numbers off over Skype so that IS can
utilize them. In addition, the existing banking branches that are under IS control are
being allow to operate with other banks by the Assad regime. Banks in Iraq have
stopped all transaction with IS-held banks, yet it is not enough.
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ISLAMIC STATE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AND FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY
Shatz, Howard J. “To Defeat the Islamic State, Follow the Money.” Politico Magazine.
September 10, 2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/to-defeat-isilfollow-the-money-110825.html#ixzz3O99FEiiL
In addition to military action and covert counterterrorism efforts, this article claims that
the most effective action against IS to cut off their cash-flow. IS acquires its money from
a variety of sources but the smuggling and illegal sale of oil is believed to be the highest
source of their income. IS maintains payroll and financial records and tracks its
expenses and monthly payments to its members and their dependents. The report
points out that payment to the individual and their family will still be paid if they are
captured or killed. There are also administrative costs, public works, and general daily
upkeep. The recommendation is attacking mobile oil refineries and tanker trucks, and
capturing and killing enough members so that IS runs out of money.
ANALYSES OF EXISTING FINANCIAL INTERDICTION OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMS
Trindle, Jamila. “The US-Led Push to Bankrupt the Islamic State Isn't Working.” Foreign Policy.
December 24, 2014.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/24/the-u-s-led-push-to-bankrupt-the-islamic-stateisnt-working/
The concept of attacking IS’s monetary stream was aided by the international group, the
Financial Action task Force (FATC). However after some research it appears that this
action would not be as easy as it seems. Due to the fact that they are dealing with an
organized economy and a group with set standards it is more difficult that tackling a
criminal organization where a weak spot might be more readily apparent. Air strikes
have served to impact the regular revenue of IS and restrictions on donations through
legal means to terrorist organizations. A set proven strategy has not been put into place
and the FATF itself has no means to enforce sanctions or any form of noncompliance.

ISLAMIC STATE –GOVERNANCE/STRUCTURE:
ISLAMIC STATE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
Shapiro, Jacob N., and Danielle F. Jung. “The terrorist bureaucracy: Inside the files of the Islamic
State in Iraq.” Boston Globe¸ December 14, 2014.
http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/12/14/the-terrorist-bureaucracy-inside-filesislamic-state-iraq/QtRMOARRYows0D18faA2FP/story.html
The administrative side of IS described in this article. Whereas often times, terrorist
organizations are solely dedicated to planning the next attacks, IS is remarked upon due
to its attempt at imitating a state with a system of government complete with records,
financials and even spreadsheets listing the qualifications of its members.
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For more information on IS record keeping and an extensive collection of primary
sources, see the collaboration paper between the Combatting Terrorism Center and the
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton:
Jung, Danielle F., Jacob N. Shapiro, Jon Wallace, and Pat Ryan. “Managing a Transnational
Insurgency: The Islamic State of Iraq’s ‘Paper Trail,’ 2005-2010.” Occasional Paper
Series, Combatting Terrorism Center. December 16, 2014.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/managing-a-transnational-insurgency-the-islamicstate-of-iraqs-paper-trail-2005-2010
EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC STATE ADMINISTRATION
Al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “A Caliphate Under Strain: The Documentary Evidence.” CTC Sentinel 9,
No. 4. (April, 2016.) https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-caliphate-under-strain-thedocumentary-evidence
Internal Islamic State documents shed new light on how the group has come under
strain as it is degraded by coalition air strikes and loses territory. The internal records
make clear these pressures have been felt in the group’s military, financial, and
administrative domains, forcing it to take measures to react and adapt.
Dettmer, Jamie. “Documents Show Degree of IS Control Over Life in Its Territories.” Voice of
America. January 24, 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/documents-show-degree-ofislamic-state-control-over-life-territory/3160301.html
Official ISIS administrative documents provide a fascinating and frequently horrifying
glimpse into the self-proclaimed caliphate, revealing the group’s anxieties, obsessions,
and harshness, with an emphasis on restricting information access and dissemination to
inhabitants.
Al-Tamini, Aymenn. “The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary
Evidence.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August, 2015):117-129. Terrorism
Research Initiative.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/447/878
This paper covers the administration of the Islamic State from its origins in Iraq in 2006,
to 2015. A collection of primary sources are utilized to show the depth of the
sophistication of the group’s government structure. The author states that as long as IS
can hold onto its strongholds, there is a good chance that it can survive even under an
enhanced containment strategy.
ISLAMIC STATE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
Caris, Charles C., and Samuel Reynolds. “ISIS Governance in Syria.” Middle East Security Report,
22. Institute for the Study of War, July 2014.
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf
49 | P a g e

This report breaks down the structure of the IS government and how it divides itself into
specific categories. These can be seen as administrative and service-oriented. The
administrative side manages religious outreach, courts, education, public relations. The
service side manages humanitarian aid, food, water, and general infrastructure. The
report further goes on to describe in detail each individual department and its function.
COMPARTMENTALIZATION

Thompson, Nick., and Shubert, Atika. “The Anatomy of ISIS: How the ‘Islamic State’ is Run, from
Oil to Beheadings,” CNN, January 14, 2015.
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/
This article provides a brief description on how different aspects of IS are broken up into
different compartments for management. A flowchart is provided that gives an
overview of all the different departments and their roles.
PROVINCIAL MANAGEMENT

Zelin, Aaron Y. “The Islamic State’s Archipelago of Provinces.” The Washington Institute,
November 14, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/theislamic-states-archipelago-of-provinces#When:17:52:49Z#ixzz3O99lsC5M
This piece describes how IS manages its various territories where it has carved out a
presence outside of Iraq and Syria and have maintained control of the captured area.
Areas such as Libya and Sinai and any other locations of similar status are seen as
wilayat or provinces and are assigned a provincial governor known as a wulat. The
wilayat once established are run in a similar manner to IS controlled areas.

COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
BRITISH
“The First 100 Days of the UK’s Campaign Against the Islamic State (30 Sep 2014-8 Jan 2015).”
Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism, briefing. Henry Jackson
Society. January 22, 2015. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/The-First-100-Days.pdf
This detailed report provides a summary of the U.K. campaign against IS and then a
series of charts showing the type of strike, equipment used, location and target.
UNITED STATES
AIR STRIKES

Joscelyn, Thomas. "US Strikes Islamic State Camp in Libyan Desert." Long War Journal.
September 24, 2017. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/09/us-launched6-airstrikes-on-islamic-state-camp-in-libyan-desert.php.
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The Islamic State, after losing its operating base of the port city of Sirte, established
several desert camps in Libya and is making an active effort to rebuild and consolidate.
A series of raids and attacks were launched by the IS groups in Libya in August and
September against military checkpoints and Libyan security forces. Following in the
wake of these attacks, U.S. forces launched six airstrikes on IS camps in Libya, killing 17
and destroying three vehicles.
“Islamic State crisis: Air Strikes target Syria stronghold.” BBC, July 5, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33401251
The U.S.-led coalition against IS has begun to deliver ordinance against IS's self-declared
capital, Raqqa. The strikes came as Kurdish YPG fighters and Syrian government troops
have managed to cut off IS’s northern supply routes to Raqqa province. The strikes were
delivered with the purpose of crippling the group’s ability to move military hardware
throughout Syria and into Iraq.
TARGETING OF LEADERSHIP

Mullen, Jethro., and Dana Ford. “ISIS ‘Emir of Suicide Bombers’ Killed in Coalition Airstrike, U.S.
Says.” CNN July 3, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/02/middleeast/isis-leaderkilled/
Tariq al-Harzi, who was in charge of overseeing efforts to move weapons and bring
foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq in addition to organizing and directing suicide
bombings, was killed by a U.S. airstrike in Syria. His brother, Ali Awni al-Harzi, who was a
suspect in the attack on the U.S. embassy in Libya was also killed in an airstrike in June
of 2015.
Weisgerber, Marcus., and Kevin Baron. “U.S. Special Ops Troops Kill ISIS Leader in Syria Raid.”
Defense One, Mary 16, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/05/us-specialops-troops-kill-isis-leader-syria-raid/113008/
U.S. Special Operations troops killed Abu Sayaff, the IS head of financial operations and
illegal oil sale, during a covert raid in eastern Syria Friday night, according to American
officials. The raid appears to be the first publicly revealed offensive U.S. military
operation on Syrian soil in the coalition fight against IS.
ONSITE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Lynch, Colum., and Seán D. Naylor. “Successful U.S. Raid Into Syria Could Lead to More Missions
There.” Foreign Policy. May 16, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/16/successfulu-s-raid-into-syria-could-lead-to-more-missions-there/
This article shows the impact of the raid that killed Abu Sayaff but also the other side of
Special Forces raids against IS. Not only do they serve to eliminate a threat or a specific
target but they also provide for the collection of a treasure trove of primary source
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intelligence taken from hard drives, cell phones and other formats as well. This
tactic/policy is described by Joint Special Operations Command as Find, Fix, Finish,
Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate or “F3EAD” which will be utilized to find additional targets
and exploit any weaknesses found.
ARMING REGIONAL GROUPS

Wong, Kristina. “Pentagon Plans to Directly Arm Sunni Fighters vs. ISIS.” The Hill, May 27. 2015.
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/243271-pentagon-has-plans-to-provide-weapons-tosunni-fighters
The Pentagon has plans to provide military equipment to Sunni tribal fighters, a defense
spokeswoman said on Wednesday, a shift from its current policy to provide the
equipment only through the central government in Baghdad. The Hill, May 27.
COUNTERING PROPAGANDA

Schmitt, Eric. “U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS's Message.” New York Times, February 16,
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-effort-toblunt-isis-message.html?mwrsm=Email
A small State Department agency will be revamped and expanded to coordinate existing
attempts to counter IS’s propaganda machine. The Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications will pursue a counter narrative to IS through
partnerships across interagency, public-private, and prominent Muslim scholars.
EVALUATION OF CT TACTICS

Joscelyn, Thomas. "Analysis: ISIS hasn't been Defeated." Long War Journal, February 22, 2018.
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/02/analysis-isis-hasnt-beendefeated.php.
The Pentagon’s latest National Defense Strategy shifts its focus from irregular warfare
and nonstate actors towards the emerging possibility of inter-state conflict. A shift in
strategy and focus will not be easy, militant groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda still
operate throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and continue to pose a credible
threat to the security interests of the international community.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “ISIS is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the
Latest Jihadist Threat.” Foreign Affairs, (March/April, 2015)
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-02-16/isis-not-terroristgroup
This article argues that the Islamic State is not a standard terrorist group due to its size,
structure, and goals. It has a 30,000-strong standing army, and holds and governs its
captured territory. Despite efforts to freeze all of IS’s assets and transactions, the group
continues to make money though illegal sale of oil and taxes, donations, and other
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sources. All of these internal sources of revenue have prevented the U.S. from
effectively cutting off its revenue. IS is not a completely homegrown organization. It
pulls in around 1,000 new recruits a month from all over the world, with the majority of
them being younger. With IS’s size, scope, and plans for a long-term establishment,
traditional CT methods will be unable to eliminate them. Regular conventional warfare
(which would not be supported by the American Public) would be unlikely to result in a
final victory against IS. Containment remains the best strategy.
REGIONAL/MIDDLE EAST
TURKEY

Teoman, Elizabeth. "Turkey’s Silent Al Qaeda Partner in Syria." Institute for the Study of War.
November 2, 2017.
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey%E2%80%99s-silent-al-qaedapartner-syria.
Turkish military and special forces have begun staging forces for potential operations
against Kurdish YPG forces in the in the Afrin Canton in the greater Idlib Province. An
agreement was reached with the AQ affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to allow for Turkish
forces to position there, despite their deployment being presented as containing AQ and
ISIS forces. Russia stationed military observers in the Afrin Canton with the goal of
preventing a Turkish attack and with the hopes of strengthening ties between Russia
and the YPG.
Malsin, Jared. "Turkey on a 'Collision Course' With the U.S. After Striking Kurdish Militias." Time,
April 27, 2017. http://time.com/4757298/turkey-united-states-militias-kurdish-ypg/.
Turkish airstrikes targeting U.S.-backed Kurds in Iraq and Syria have put Turkey and the
U.S. at odds, as foreign powers now look towards post-ISIS Syria. The U.S. has worked
closely with Kurdish militant groups in the fight against ISIS. Turkey regards the fighters
as a terrorist organization that threaten to Turkish security and national interests.
Kadercan, Burak. “What’s Eating Turkey? Ankara and the Islamic State.” War on the Rocks, July
30, 2015. http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/whats-eating-turkey-ankara-and-theislamic-state/
This article examines the political difficulties that Turkey has in fully dedicating itself
against IS. While Turkey has conducted targeted strikes against IS, and allowed Incirlik
Air Base to be used for coalition strikes, it remains hesitant to commit. Despite the
support of the coalition forces, there has been some concern over Turkey’s support and
aid to anti-Assad groups. Domestic politics tend be a focal point in Turkey’s decision
making, especially with its targeting of Kurdish groups as well as IS. Turkish and Kurdish
nationalism fuels this division, while the Islamic State is exploits it. While it is vital to
53 | P a g e

destroy IS, Turkey is worried that a weakened or destroyed IS will lead to an
emboldened PKK.
Sly, Liz., and Erin Cunningham. “Turkey Strikes Islamic State Targets in Syria for the First Time.”
Washington Post, July 24, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkeystrikes-islamic-state-targets-in-syria-for-the-first-time/2015/07/24/c68b0377-87854306-bc7e-ffe4b866d9ab_story.html
Turkish jets started bombing runs against IS targets following a deadly explosion in a
border town. The country's foreign ministry described IS as its "primary national security
threat" and granted U.S. aircraft permission to use its airbases. However, following the
strikes against IS, Turkey conducted raids against Kurdish militants showing a wider
range of Turkey’s security concerns.
RUSSIA

Baev, Pavel K. "Russia Stumbles in the Fog of Syrian War." Brookings. February 21, 2018.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/21/russia-stumbles-inthe-fog-of-syrian-war/.
Russian strategy in Syria to preserve Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has taken setback
after setback, as Russian forces on the ground continue to take casualties and its proxies
fail to make headway. Much of their political failure stems from their firm support for
the Assad regime, with ISIS no longer the threat it once was, the international
community now turns towards the other armed groups in the region and the Assad
regime, putting Russia in a difficult position. Independent Russian security contractors
aligned with the Assad regime have created political strife that Putin has yet to address
in earnest, and without the support of the international community, Russia’s investment
in Syria may fall flat.
Grygiel, Jakub, and Jake Miraldi. Comment on "MWI Podcast: Russia, Global Security, and
Limited War." Modern War Institute (audio blog), August 30, 2017.
https://mwi.usma.edu/mwi-podcast-russia-global-security-limited-war-dr-jakubgrygiel/.
Dr. Jakub Grygiel, of John Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies,
evaluates the concept of “limited war” and how it is utilized in modern military
strategy. A particular emphasis is placed on Russia based on its actions in Ukraine and
Syria.
"Making Sense of Russia's Involvement in Syria." Middle East Policy Council.
http://www.mepc.org/commentary/making-sense-russias-involvement-syria.
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President Bashar al-Assad’s future may lie in the hands of Russia, as their most powerful
ally continues to intervene on the Assad regime’s behalf. Without the support of Russia,
U.S. coalition forces would likely remove the contentious president from power should a
suitable internationally recognized replacement present itself. As ISIS and other
insurgent groups are removed from the region, the future of Syria remains uncertain.
No doubt, without a regional consensus and international agreement, conflict in Syria
will continue.
KURDISH

“Syrian Kurdish forces capture key ISIL-held town.” Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/syrian-kurdish-units-close-tal-abyad150615155954847.html
In an important victory against IS that cut off the group from the key supply route to
Raqqa province, Syrian Kurdish fighters have claimed control of the strategic town of Tal
Abyad. A monitoring group said some fighting in the town continued after the initial
offensive. The offensive, which also resulted in the displacement over 16,000 people,
was backed by U.S.-led airstrikes.
ASSAD REGIME FORCES

Smyth, Phillip. “Assad Strikes Back.” Foreign Policy. May 27, 2015.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/27/assads-foreign-fighters-dont-come-cheap-iranhezbollah-shiite-fighters/
The Syrian regime is gearing up for a counteroffensive that relies on Iran’s money and
Shiite foreign fighters from as far away as Central Asia to push back against the Islamic
State. Using cash and coercion, Assad has launched new efforts to bolster troop levels
and engender further loyalty. Last week, the Syrian regime announced its hope for a $1
billion credit line from Tehran to continue the fight. More importantly, Iranian-backed
foreign-fighter recruitment and deployment have increased dramatically.
TRIBAL AND SAHWA FORCES

Cigar, Dr. Norman. Tribal Militias: An Effective Tool to Counter Al-Qaida and its Affiliates?
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press,
2014. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1230
This article provides the history of the Sunni Awakening as a push back against AQ after
it tried to alter/remove the local tribal cultures and economies. As a result, the tribes
during the Shawa (Awakening) moved towards U.S. support. The tribes had been
previously formed into their Shawa groups, a tribal militia supported by the local
government and the U.S. When the government was done with them after their role in
combatting AQ, they pushed them aside and wanted to take their weapons away. As
poverty and sectarian issues divided the government and the Shawa militias, IS was able
to take hold. IS either directly intimidated the Shawa members, or threatened and
55 | P a g e

attacked their families, appealed to their Sunni connections or offered a better option
than a Shia backed government and militias that they were at odds with. On the other
side, the Shia tribes felt that they were alone in their fight against IS. The article argues
for the importance of having a “National Guard” of both Sunni and Shia and provides
policy recommendations for when the U.S. is a tribal militia’s patron.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Yeo, Mike. "Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines Target ISIS in Trilateral Air Patrols." Defense
News, October 13, 2017. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/10/13/malaysiaindonesia-and-philippines-target-isis-in-trilateral-air-patrols/.
The three nations have begun trilateral naval air patrols over the Sulu Sea. With ISIS
seeking to build a greater presence in the area, the air patrols are designed to track ISIS
militants as they use the Sulu Sea to travel between the three countries. Patrols will
rotate each month by country and are expected to extend beyond January 2018.

ANALYSIS:
POST-MOSUL AND RAQQA
“Fighting ISIS: The Road to and Beyond Raqqa.” International Crisis Group. April 28, 2017.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/easternmediterranean/syria/b053-fighting-isis-road-and-beyond-raqqa
The U.S. campaign against ISIS in northern Syria both benefits from and is complicated
by its partnership with an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group
fighting against its NATO ally Turkey. The challenges will grow as the war on ISIS moves
further east.
RESPONSE TO IS EXECUTION VIDEOS
Miller, Aaron David. “4 Takeaways From the Fight Against ISIS After the Death of Jordan’s Pilot.”
Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center. February 3, 2015.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/4-takeaways-the-fight-against-isis-after-the-deathjordan%E2%80%99s-pilot
This article looks at four distinct aspects of the circumstances surrounding the death of
the Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasabeh. IS was able to use the televised threats to garner
attention and make others react to it along with showing a willingness to engage in
brutal acts regardless of any regional fallout. The airstrikes in response to hostage taking
may end up pushing IS to find a new way to garner resources or increased its relevance.
One possibility is that they may switch towards organized attacks on Western targets.
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ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-IS EFFORTS
Lister, Charles. “A Long Way from Success: Assessing the War on the Islamic State.” Perspectives
on Terrorism 9, no.4 (August, 2015):3-13. Terrorism Research Initiative.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/439/870
It is difficult to accurately measure significant gains against the Islamic State based on
the current strategy. No solid strategic advances have been made, and IS still remains a
capable armed group with the abilities to seize new territory and defend against
attackers. The author calls for a re-evaluation of the current anti-IS strategy and the
“core analytical understandings driving counter-actions.” While IS espouses an
apocalyptic Salafi-jihadi ideology, they also push a wider narrative as the champions of
the oppressed and disenfranchised Sunni Muslim. This gives them a wider basis for
recruitment and appeal that their normal ideology does not have. Measuring success by
land reclaimed and assets destroyed is not an effective mechanism for success. IS has
shown that it is a flexible organization, capable of adapting to different tactics and
evading defeat. This article also calls for an increased focus on Syria, as the majority of
the airstrikes have been relocated to Iraq. Syria has shown itself to be a major staging
point for IS and needs to be addressed. The author concludes that while conducting any
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations are difficult, multifaceted
operations, IS has clear weaknesses in their strategic thinking that can be exploited.
ARGUMENT FOR GROUND FORCES
Ottaway, Marina. “We Bomb ISIL: Then What? Viewpoints 63 (2014) 1-7. Woodrow Wilson
Center. https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/244617385?access_key=keynQuSSQE1XF0rhF7WskVZ&allow_share=true&escape=false&show_recommendations=f
alse&view_mode=scroll
The impact of airstrikes is analyzed mainly through the lack of follow up by a ground
attack. Territory cannot be recaptured nor can IS be pushed out of an area by airstrikes
alone. They can serve as a containment strategy and can be effective if ground forces
utilize the attacks to push back a weakened enemy. However, the Iraqi military and the
Free Syrian Army are disorganized and along with the Kurdish and the Shia militias all
have their own personal goals in pushing back IS. A coordinated U.S. air and ground
attack would be effective but the political situation surrounding it prevents such action.
IS THREAT TO WESTERN COUNTRIES
Hegghammer, Thomas., and Petter Nesser. “Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to
Attacking the West.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August, 2015):14-30. Terrorism
Research Initiative.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/440/871
This article examines the threats made and the attacks carried out by IS in the West and
Australia from January 2011-June 2015. A series of charts are providing showing the
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links between plots, organizations and attacks. Upon evaluation, the article shows that
IS has a decentralization attack approach that relies more on having sympathizers
conduct individual or small group attacks. Returning foreign fighters have not played a
major factor in these attacks yet. However, with the continual expansion and resources
of IS, it is important to remain alert for additional attacks and different methods and
types of attacks.
ISRAELI MILITARY PERSPECTIVE ON IS
Herzog, Brig. Gen. Michael. “Jihad on the Horizon: The ISIL Threat from an Israeli Perspective.”
Expert View, Britain Israel Communications & Research Centre (BICOM). March, 2015.
http://static.bicom.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/150217-Isil-IV.pdf
Israeli Brigadier General, Michael Herzog provides an analysis of IS and the threat it
poses to the West, Israel, and the ideological similarities between Hamas and IS. The
threat IS poses to the West comes from its ability to tap into a wide virtual network of
extremists willing to conduct attacks in their current country. IS is not a priority threat
to Israel at this time but they are preparing and watching their advances into
neighboring countries. The biggest threats to Israel remains Hamas, Iran and Hezbollah.
His recommendations are to: Boost the military campaign, address the nature of the
Islamist factor, do not give Iran a free pass to operate and expand in the region, support
liberal pro-Western actors such as the Kurds and Jordan, and encourage ties based on
shared interests between Israel and Sunni powers.
USING THE ISLAMIC STATE’S INFORMATION AGAINST THEM
Price, Bryan., Dan Milton, and Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi,. “The Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant: More than Just a June Surprise.” CTC Sentinel, June 30, 2014.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-levant-more-thanjust-a-june-surprise
This report begins by focusing on the fact that IS has been a work in progress since 2002
and that its offense in June of 2014 should not have come as a surprise. The author
examines IS published information and documentation through Twitter and IS’s annual
report. IS not only publishes an annual report of their attacks but will tweet information
regarding their attacks in the days following. Utilizing this information, patterns, tactics,
costs of operations, and the extent of their logistics network.
RESTORATION OF NATIONALISM AS A CT TACTIC.
Harrison, Ross. “Newsflash: Time is Running Out to Defeat ISIS.” National Interest, August 21,
2015. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/newsflash-time-running-out-defeat-isis-13650
Harrison argues that IS trying to destroy the nationalism of individual countries in order
to further its own goals. Once the traditional unifying factors and identities are gone, it
will be easier for them to implement their own ideology. Ross argues that U.S. needs to
58 | P a g e

recreate borders to enforce traditional nationalism, work with Saudi Arabia and Iran and
high level clerics to refute IS’s ideology and use the more moderate groups as a bulwark
against the more extreme ones.
THE NEED FOR INCREASING UNDERSTANDING OF IS IN ORDER TO BETTER COMBAT IT
Kadercan, Burak. “3 Huge (And Dangerous) Myths about ISIS.” National Interest, August 30,
2015. http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/3-huge-dangereous-myths-about-isis13740
The article states that the security community does not have a set, concrete method for
dealing with IS. There are a variety of ideas regarding what the “true nature” of the
Islamic State is and how best to counter it. The author argues that since IS operates on
a “territorial flexibility” that the loss of or gaining of land does not greatly impact the
groups legitimacy. While IS tries to expand, it is dependent upon sectarian strife and
thus tends to limit itself to Sunni-Majority areas. Feeding off of and amplifying the
sectarian strife allows IS to maintain support from Sunnis under its rule that are more
concerned with Shiite-dominated forces. The Islamic State has lost several battles and
engagements and pushes a narrative of a “capable underdog” in which martyrdom is
relished and the sheer act of fighting against overwhelming odds is lauded.
COMPARISON TO OTHER JIHADI PROTO-STATES
Lia, Brynjar. “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August,
2015):31-41. Terrorism Research Initiative,
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/441/872
With the rise of the Islamic State, and its proclamation that it is indeed an actual state, it
is important to compare IS to other past and present “jihadi proto-states” in order to
better understand it. The comparison allows for a better look at the common features,
of these types of states and a better look into understanding their aggressive tactics.
The author states that each of these proto-states has four common characteristics: they
are intensely ideological, internationalist, territorially expansive, and irredentist. The
governments tend to be harsh and repressive and often are established to combat rival
Islamists and depend on the support of external constituencies.
IS DELEGITIMIZING REGIONAL STATES
Rubin, Lawrence. “Why the Islamic State won’t become a Normal State.” Monkey Cage (Blog),
Washington Post, July 9, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2015/07/09/why-the-islamic-state-wont-become-a-normal-state/
The author argues that the Islamic State is also an ideological and idea-centric threat to
the Middle-East. The concept of IS being an actual state is evaluated. If IS became a
legitimate and recognized state internationally, it would not bend to international
pressure to normalize itself, and would still be a destabilizing influence in the region.
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Sunni Arab states would not want their citizens leaving to join IS and the constant
recruitment and other actions by IS do not recognize the political legitimacy of other
states or international institutions. The threat of IS’s ideology attacking the legitimacy of
other state’s practice of Islam, in turn attacks the legitimacy of the state itself.
WOMEN RECRUITS AND THE ISLAMIC STATE
“Women and Children Fighting Alongside Islamic State Militants in Marawi.” Asian
Correspondent, September 5, 2017. https://asiancorrespondent.com/2017/09/womenchildren-fighting-alongside-islamic-state-militants-marawi/-YWdcU37b6psDB5tf.97
The Philippine military began what it announced as a final push into Marawi to force out
the Maute Group and Abu Sayaff members who have besieged the city since May. The
military reports not only encountering snipers and the expected IED’s and traps but also
being shot at by women and children. Lt Gen. Carlito Galvez, of the Philippine forces in
western Mindanao claimed that the city should be secure soon but expects the fighting
to become over more intense as the militant groups become desperate.
Jacinto, Leela. “The Young Women Behind France’s ‘Terrorist Commando’ Network.” France 24.
September 15, 2016. http://www.france24.com/en/20160914-france-terrorismwomen-jihad-paris-gas-cylinder-islamic-state-terrorist-commando
The arrest of four Frenchwomen linked to a failed Paris terror plot has exposed the
increasing role women are playing in conducting attacks as ISIL comes under increasing
pressure. Profiles of the four women detail their paths to radicalization and affiliations
with other known jihadists.
“Women and the Longevity of the Islamic State.” Soufan Group. February 12, 2016.
http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-women-and-the-longevity-of-the-islamic-state/
Women are essential to ISIL’s vision of a utopian society. In the face of territorial losses,
the group hopes to ensure its longevity, in part through a continued flow of female
recruits to produce offspring for jihadists to groom.
Saltman, Erin Marie., and Melanie Smith. “‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender and the ISIS
Phenomenon.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_
Phenomenon.pdf
This paper examines how and why women are recruited into IS, the role they play and
what can be done to counter this. The first section of this paper examines the “push”
and “pull” factors that drive women to join IS and the female-specific propaganda
utilized. This propaganda presents that while women are poorly treated in Western
countries that they will be “valued” as mothers of future jihadis and the protectors of
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Islam. The next section of the paper provides four distinct profiles of recruited female IS
members and concludes with the reality of what women face in IS held territory. The
last section of the paper prevents different ideas on how to prevent radicalization, and
de-radicalize those already affected.
Youssef, Nancy A., and Shane Harris. “The Women Who Secretly Keep ISIL Running” Daily Beast,
July 5, 2015. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/05/the-women-whosecretly-keep-isis-running.html
Umm Sayyaf, the widow of ISIL’s chief financier, Abu Sayyaf, has offered U.S. defense
personnel (after her capture) an unprecedented look into the inner workings of the
group. She describes a women's network within the caliphate whose duties include
"recruitment, retention, intelligence, and enforcing sexual slavery.
IN DEPTH-VIEW/INSIDE LOOK
SIMILARITY TO OTHER INSURGENCY/TERRORIST GROUPS

Huang, Reyko. “The Islamic State as an Ordinary Insurgency.” Monkey Cage (Blog), Washington
Post, May, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2015/05/14/how-the-islamic-state-compares-with-other-armed-non-stategroups/
The author compares the actions of the Islamic State to other terrorist and insurgent
groups. Different examples are cited in which other groups, committing similar
atrocities were not covered to the same degree as the Islamic State in the media. The
author argues that this is mainly due to the fact that IS makes everything so visible.
Anyone can see the activities posted online, whereas previous groups only received
exposure from news coverage and history texts.
BLOGS ANALYZING IS AND OTHER MILITANT GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
This is a series of regularly updated blogs from different sources that analyze various aspects of different
jihadist groups and look at different CT and CVE tactics.

Wing, Joel. “Musings on Iraq.” (Blog). September 14, 2015 (most recent update)
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/
Blog written by Joel Wing, who has written for the Jamestown Foundation, CNN,
Christian Science Monitor, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and several
others. It focuses on as the title says- news, politics, economics and society in Iraq.
Several postings have cataloged the type, number of, and casualties of attacks in Iraq by
year, month, and week.
Zelin, Aaron Y. “Jihadology.” (Blog) September 10, 2015. (Most recent update)
http://jihadology.net/
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A collection of videos, magazines, and other publications from the Islamic State that are
collected and posted by Aaron Y. Zelin who is a fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/view/aaron-y.-zelin
“Experts Weigh In” Markaz Middle East Politics & Policy (Blog) Brookings. July 13, 2015 (most
recent update). http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/series/experts-weigh-in
The Brookings blog titled, “Experts Weigh In” provides multi-entry series concerning
countering IS propaganda, tactics and evaluating current CT strategy.

OFFICIAL REMARKS:
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS
"Trump Administration on ISIS, Al Qaeda." Wilson Center. October 23, 2017.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/trump-administration-isis-al-qaeda.
This report by the Wilson Center outlines the Trump Administrations stance on ISIS and
the conflict in the Middle East. The article contains a series of statements from
President Trump, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Defense
Secretary James Mattis, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, and Secretary of
Homeland Security John F. Kelly, and General Joseph Votel. The Wilson center breaks
down the statements and provides a comprehensive analysis of the Trump
Administration’s posture on Syira, ISIS, and al-Qaeda.
Obama, Barack. “Remarks on Proposed Legislation Submitted to the Congress to Authorize the
Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Terrorist
Organization.” Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents (February 11, 2015):1-3.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=100972046&site=eh
ost-live
This speech given by President Obama describes the proposed legislation that will
authorize the use of military force against IS. He also discusses the level of cooperation
amongst international forces against IS and addresses the reports of sinking morale
amongst IS fighters.
“Transcription of Obama’s Remarks on the Fight against ISIS.” New York Times, September 10,
2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/obamas-remarks-onthe-fight-against-isis.html?_r=0
The transcript of President Obama’s remarks on fighting IS describe the success of
previous campaigns against terrorism. He then moves to describe a separation between
Islam and IS and proceeds to mention their attacks and brutal tactics. President Obama
then tells about the U.S. airstrikes and that the mission against IS will be a combined
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operation amongst many coalition nations and will just be the responsibility of the U.S.
alone.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRESS BRIEFINGS
“Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room.”
News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense. January 6, 2015.
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5561
Rear Adm. John Kirby discusses the progress of the U.S. campaign against IS, halting
their momentum and the future of U.S. involvement in the area. He also covers
recruiting of foreign fighters by IS and what is being done for the Yazidis.
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Lt. Gen. Terry in the Pentagon Briefing Room. News
Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense December 18, 2014.
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5559
This press briefing by Lt. Gen. James Terry discussing the establishment of Combined
Joint task Force Operations Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) and how it’s a 40 nation
coalition designed to degrade and destroy IS. In addition, Lt. Gen. Terry speaks on using
the term Daesh going forward instead of IS due to the term being utilized the regional
vernacular for IS and that it loosely translates to “crush underneath the foot.”
“Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in the
Pentagon Briefing Room.” News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense. August 21,
2014. http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5491
In this press briefing Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel beings by speaking on the
murder of James Foley and the continued airstrike campaign against IS. He continues to
describe the continued threat that IS will pose and that the U.S. is pursuing long-term
campaign. The briefing is turned over to General Martin Dempsey who mentions that
importance of having a stable Iraqi government as part of defeating IS. They both then
answer questions regarding military operations, the attempted hostage rescue, support
of the Kurdish Peshmerga and reiteration that this will be a long campaign.
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
The Growing Strategic Threat of ISIS: Congressional testimony before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, (2015) (Statement of James F. Jeffrey of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.) From the Washington Institute.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-the-strategicthreat-from-isis
The transcript of Ambassador James Jeffrey regarding the threat of IS to the Middle East
and surrounding areas. He identifies that IS is not just another violent radical Islamic
extremist group but its seemingly global appeal in regards to recruitment, “nihilist
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worship of violence, control over much territory and six or more million people,
conventional as well as nonconventional military capabilities, and appeal as a caliphate
all render it unique and very difficult to combat.” He continues to point out that the
weakness of the Middle East state system does not allow for a wait and see style
campaign and that operations should be accelerated. He concludes by discussing the
importance of political developments in the Middle East when considering fighting IS
and how Iran cannot be allowed to gain a greater foothold in the region.
Countering ISIL’s Financing. Congressional testimony before the House Committee on Financial
Services. (2014) (Statement of Patrick B. Johnston of the Rand Corporation.) From the
Rand Corporation, November 13, 2014.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT419/RAND_CT419
.pdf
In his testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, Patrick Johnston points out
the sources of IS’s wealth, and how it grew over the years. The most likely areas of
spending consist of expanding territorial control in Syria and into Lebanon, Jordan, Israel
and Gaza, and building an infrastructure and asserting its governance over already
captured areas. It is recommended that in order to greatly impact IS’s finances, the U.S.
and coalition forces need to cut off IS’s access to oil, ransom money, foreign donors, and
extortion payments. However, due to the clandestine nature of these transactions and
limited cooperation from Turkey and regional partners who could identify the banks and
donors, stopping these revenue sources will be difficult. At the end of the testimony,
Johnston provides three policy recommendations: 1. Continue to conduct airstrikes
against oil assets and other financial targets; 2. Develop more effective financial
intelligence collection and analysis capabilities regarding IS’s financial networks; and 3.
Continue supporting the deployment of U.S. advisors to Iraqi Security Forces.
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PART II: ARMED GROUPS BY REGION
ARMED GROUPS IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, 2011 -

MAPS

From the Institute for the Study of War: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Regime%20%20Iranian%20Posture%20Last%20one.pdf?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New
%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report
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IMPORTANT POINTS
•
•
•

Over six years of civil war in Syria have left more than 400,000 dead with millions of refugees
pouring into neighboring countries and across Europe.
As anti-government rebel groups coalesce into larger coalitions, the Syrian civil war offers a ripe
opportunity for Iran, Russia, and the Gulf states to exert geopolitical influence.
These selection of articles detail the pro-regime forces and its militias, elements of the
moderate and Islamist oppositions, the Kurds, and the Islamic State (IS / ISIL / DAESH).

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
BAATH PARTY
Belhadj, S. “The Decline of Syria’s Baath Party.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
December 5, 2012. http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=50258&lang=en
This article outlines the command structures of Syria’s Baath party at the state,
provincial, and district levels. It argues that the party has been steadily losing its grip on
power since the uprising began. The author attributes the decline to “the progressive
alienation of the party’s cadres as violence intensified, as well as the increased
involvement of the state’s security services in directing the party, [which] defeated the
Baath’s efforts to spearhead a political counteroffensive and regain popular support for
the regime.”
ALAWITES AND THE RISE TO POWER
Barnard, A., and Hwaida Saad. “No Easy Route if Assad Opts to go, or to Stay, in Syria.” The New
York Times. December 24, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/25/world/middleeast/no-easy-route-if-bashar-alassad-opts-to-go-or-stay.html
A brief look at the people and ideologies that have influenced Bashar al-Assad’s
presidency and the role psychology will play in whether or not he agrees to cede power.
Gives particular attention to his father’s personal legacy, pan-Arabism, and Alawite fears
of retribution should the country’s Sunni majority gain power. Reports that top military
generals may prevent Assad from leaving or accepting any compromise solution with
rebel forces. The report includes a graphic on Assad’s “inner circle.”
“The ‘Secretive Sect’ in charge of Syria.” BBC, May 17, 2012.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18084964
This article provides a profile of Syria’s Alawite population. It serves to outline their
religious beliefs, their ascendancy to the top ranks of the state apparatus, and the role
of Awalite-Sunni tensions in the ongoing civil war. For a more detailed look at Alawite
doctrine and social history, see the article by Pipes, also listed in this section.
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Pipes, D. “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria.” Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (October,
1989): 429-450. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283331
A background is provided on the Alawites and their role in Syrian society, giving
particular attention to their relationship with the country’s Sunni majority. The author
argues that the sect’s rise to power “resulted from an unplanned but sectarian
transformation of public life in Syria….internal divisions caused non-Ba’th civilian Sunnis
to lose power. This provided an opening that Ba’thist officers of Alawi origins
exploited.” The 2011 uprising was predicted nearly two decades in advance: “It appears
inevitable that the Alawis - still a small and despised minority, for all their present power
- will eventually lose their control over Syria. When this happens, it is likely that conflicts
along communal lines will bring them down, with the critical battle taking place
between the Alawi rulers and the Sunni majority. In this sense, the Alawis' fall - be it
through assassinations of top figures, a palace coup or a regional revolt- is likely to
resemble their rise.”
THE 2011 UPRISING
Hinnebusch, R. “Syria: From ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’ to Revolution? International Affairs
88(1), (Jan. 20, 2012):95-113.
The article states that Bashar al-Assad’s early program of ‘reform’ was really a
solidification of his father’s authoritarian regime, an effort to win over marginalized
elites by implementing crony capitalist policies. The solidification of Bashar’s policies are
seen as leading to the 2011 uprising, framing the latter as a function of “the
overconcentration of power and patronage in the ruling clan….the spread of electronic
media [that] allowed political mobilization to take place as the party’s incorporative
capacity weakened and…the absence of an alternative integration of youth into jobs
that would give then a stake in the status quo….”

ARMED GROUPS: INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW OF ARMED GROUPS AND STATES IN SYRIA
Laub, Zachary. "Who’s Who in Syria’s Civil War." Council on Foreign Relations. April 28, 2017.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whos-who-syrias-civil-war.
The report from the Council on Foreign Relations attempts to demystify the complex
sides fighting in the Syrian civil war. The article goes into detail in breaking down the
various elements fighting on each side of the war, and describes their motivations for
doing so, and who makes up each group.
"Syria crisis: Where Key Countries Stand." BBC News, October 30, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587.
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This article from BBC provides an overview of the major international players that have
become involved in the Syrian war. BBC presents this guide to Syria during a time when
the nations are meeting in Vienna to determine an international plan for dealing with
the conflict.
Lund, Aron. “The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria.” Combating Terrorism Center. August
27, 2013. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-non-state-militant-landscape-in-syria
Provides an in-depth overview of anti-Assad rebel groups; hardline Islamist factions;
Syrian Kurds and the PKK; and Syrian and foreign pro-government militias.

PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES:
OVERVIEW
Lund, Aron. “Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias?” Syria in Crisis. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. March 2, 2015.
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59215
This report follows the journey of 2 journalists embedded with Assad’s army. They point
out that the support Assad has among various armed groups and militias goes far
beyond the Shabiha (paid pro-Assad Alawites). Apart from the Shabiha, this report
points out that the Assad regime began to arm and give money to various unemployed
loyalists starting in 2011. It also provides the names of various pro-Assad militias: The
National Defense Forces, The Baath Battalion, The Jerusalem Brigade, The Syrian
Resistance, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and The Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-General Command.
“Syria: Pro-Government Paramilitary Forces.” The Carter Center. November 5, 2013.
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syriaconflict/Pro-GovernmentParamilitaryForces.pdf
This report provides information on the various pro-government militias operating in
Syria. It points out that the most prominent of these militias operate under an umbrella
group: National Defense Forces. It points out how the NDF can complicate the already
complicated scenario in a country riddled with a myriad of militant groups. It also draws
much of its support base from various minorities who join due to the belief that the
minorities are under direct threat from Sunni forces, making it sectarian. The NDF have
become increasingly important as the government forces are facing defeats.
SYRIAN ARMED FORCES - SYRIAN ARAB ARMY
STRATEGY

Kozak, Christopher. "Pro-Assad Coalition Set to Escalate in Southern Syria." Institute for the
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Study of War, January 31, 2018.
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-update-pro-assad-coalitionset-escalate-southern-syria.
This graphic from the ISW demonstrates the complex situation in southern Syria. The
visual shows that the Syrian coalition including Russia and Iran is preparing to launch
combat operations in violation of the de-escalation zone and ceasefire agreement.
Officials fear that further violence in southern Syria may leave al-Qaeda an opportunity
to consolidate their strength.
Kozak, Christopher. “‘An Army in All Corners’: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in Syria.” Middle
East Security Report, No. 26. Institute for the Study of War. April 2015.
http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/An%20Army%20in%20All%20Corners%
20by%20Chris%20Kozak%201.pdf
This report points out that the U.S. policy towards Syria is that Bashar al Assad is the
best option for Syria. It points out that Assad is still a central actor in the war; however,
the Syrian Arab Army is not ready to gain a decisive victory in 2015. It points out that the
SAA continues to deal with issues of attrition and political unreliability. This is forcing
the Assad regime to rely more on Hezbollah and other Iranian backed Shia militias.
SETBACKS/DEFEATS

“Al-Qaida-Led Rebels Seize Airport From Syrian Military.” Voice of America. September 9,
2015.
http://www.voanews.com/content/al-qaida-led-rebels-seize-airport-from-syrianmilitary/2953576.html
This news article points out that al-Qaeda and other rebel groups defeated the Syrian
Army and captured an important air base in Idlib.
Blanford, Nicholas. “Admitting Military ‘Fatigue,’ Assad Pulls back, Redeploys Syrian Forces. Al
Jazeera America. June 27, 2015. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/27/witharmys-fatigue-assad-pulls-forces-back.html
This article points out how Bashar al Assad admitted that his “all corners” war strategy is
not working in the fight against rebels. It points out that desertion and casualties
reduced the Syrian Army’s size from 300,000 to 80,000/100,000. The article also
provides other information on the Army’s condition.
Bender, Jeremy. “Here are all of the Problems with the Reeling Syrian Army.” Business Insider.
May 1, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/the-syrian-military-is-on-the-verge-ofcollapse-2015-4
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This article points out various problems with the Syrian Army in its fight against Assad. It
discusses how rebel gains to the south of Damascus are demoralizing the Syrian Army. It
has also divided the Army and has increased Assad’s reliance on foreign forces.
COOPERATION WITH KURDISH FORCES

“Kurds, Syrian army battle ISIS in Syria’s Hasaka: monitor.” Al Monitor. June 27, 2015.
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/06/27/Kurds-Syrian-armybattle-ISIS-in-Syria-s-Hasaka-monitor.html
This article describes fighting in June 2015 in northern Syria, for the town of Hasaka. It
points out that local Kurdish forces and the Syrian Army worked together to fight ISIL in
this area.
LIMITED STRIKES AGAINST IS

Vinograd, Cassandra and Cheik Omar, Ammar. “Syria, ISIS Have Been 'Ignoring' Each Other on
Battlefield, Data Suggests.” NBC News, December 11, 2014.
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/syria-isis-have-been-ignoring-eachother-battlefield-data-suggests-n264551
This article points out how the Syrian Army and ISIL seem to be ignoring each other on
the battlefield. As of December, 2014 it seems that both parties were more focused on
fighting smaller groups instead of directly and intensely fighting each other. In late
November only 6% of Assad airstrikes struck ISIL targets.
COLLABORATION WITH RUSSIA

Williams, Dan. "Russia Sending Advanced Air Defenses To Syria." Reuters, September 11, 2015.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-arms/russia-sending-advancedair-defenses-to-syria-sources-idUSKCN0RB1Q020150911.
Russia is in the process of sending an advanced anti-aircraft missile system to President
Bashar Al Assad’s forces. Some parts of the system are already said to be positioned at
an airfield in Latakia. It is also believed that Russian troops will be operating this air
defense system.
Crawford, Jamie. “U.S. Warns Russia on Military Buildup in Syria.” CNN, September 10, 2015.
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/politics/russia-syria-military-buildup-kerry-lavrov/
Responding to reports that Russian military forces are participating in the Syrian civil
war, on President Assad’s side, the U.S. strongly condemned the Russian involvement.
This article points out that Russian forces are providing training to the Syrian Army on
the use of various military systems Russia has given to Assad’s forces.
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NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE
Abdel Aziz, Ghaith. “With Assad’s Troops Stretched, Fighters Join NDF for Salary and
Stability.” Syria Deeply. October 8, 2014.
http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/10/6205/assads-troops-stretched-fightersjoin-ndf-salary-stability/
The NDF is a good option for fighters that are looking for a steady salary. This article
points out that some fighters join the NDF after leaving the Syrian Army. It also provides
a host of other information on the dynamics surrounding the NDF.
Solomon, Erika. “Insight: Battered by war, Syrian army creates its own replacement.” Reuters,
April 21, 2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/21/us-syria-crisis-paramilitary-insightidUSBRE93K02R20130421
This article points out how joining locally based paramilitary groups that still gain a
share of Assad’s victories is seen as a better alternative to joining the Army. These
militias have become more and more prominent as sectarian lines divided the Army.
The irregular loyalists, such as the National Defense Forces, are seen as a more effective
force as they are generally made up of minorities.
THE JERUSALEM BRIGADE
Dark, Edward. “Pro-regime Sunni fighters in Aleppo defy sectarian narrative.” Syria Pulse. Al
Monitor. March 14, 2014.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/syria-aleppo-sunni-quds-baathbrigades.html#
This article briefly discusses the Al Quds (Jerusalem Brigade). It describes the group as
being made up of Sunni Palestinian refugees who are pro-regime. It also discusses other
Sunni pro-regime groups, such as the Baath Battalions.
BAATH BATTALIONS
Lund, Aron. “The Baath Battalions Move Into Damascus.” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. January 13, 2014.
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54167
This article points out that the Baath Battalion, created by the Syrian Baath Party, have
been appearing at more government checkpoints. The purpose of the Baath Battalions,
it seems, is to support the Syrian Army. The article also says that they have been
recruiting more in order to step up their presence in Damascus. Fighters generally wear
the Baath Party logo. The article also provides other information on the Baath
Battalions, including information on their roots in the Syrian Army.
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Dark, Edward. “Syrian Baath Militia Commander goes Rags-to-Riches.” Syria Pulse. Al Monitor,
November 20, 2013.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/baath-party-brigade-syria-waraleppo.html#
This article discusses the commander of the Baath Battalions, Nidal. It points out how
the commander was a typical underpaid civil servant until he was appointed as
commander of the Baath Battalions. It says the Baath Battalions were set up in Aleppo
after rebels stormed the city in 2013. The force is made up of all Baath volunteers. They
received their training from the Republican Guard.
ARAB NATIONALIST GUARD
Harbi, Rana. “Arab Nationalists take up Arms in the Battle for Syria.” Al-Akhbar English. May 5,
2014.
http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/arab-nationalists-take-arms-battle-syria
This article provides information on the Arab Nationalist Guard (ANG). It describes them
as being from a movement linked to pan Arabism created by Abdel Nasser.
MUQAWAMAT AL-SURIYAH (THE SYRIAN RESISTANCE)
“The Syrian Resistance.” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/syrian-resistance-tsr
TRAC provides some basic information on the Syrian Resistance group. It says the group
is composed mostly of Alawite and Shia. It also provides the name of the group’s leader:
Mihrac Ural.

SHIA FORCES
IRAN’S USE OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA
Smyth, Phillip. “The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects.” The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy. Policy Focus 138 (February 2015).
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-shiite-jihad-in-syria-andits-regional-effects
This report offers a detailed analysis of Iran-backed Shiite proxy groups fighting on
behalf of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, including their recruitment techniques,
weapons used, and the narrative of pan-Shiite jihad. While often stated that these
groups seek to defend Shiite holy sites from Sunni opponents, the author argues that
the militias’ deployments reflected a “highly organized geostrategic and ideological
effort” by Iran to extend its influence across the Middle East and support its ally in Syria.
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HEZBOLLAH
ROLE OF HEZBOLLAH IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Levitt, Matthew. “Waking Up the Neighbors: How Regional Intervention Is Transforming
Hezbollah.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy. July 23, 2015.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/waking-up-the-neighborshow-regional-intervention-is-transforming-hezbollah
This article presents the tactical and structural changes occurring as a result of
Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria. The group added two new commands- one on the
Lebanon-Syria border and another within Syria proper- and has moved a number of
fighters from southern Lebanon to fight in support of Assad. In addition to sending
trainers to both Iraq and Yemen, Hezbollah’s regional involvement details a significant
shift from supporting the Assad regime to participating in “an existential battle for the
future of the region.”
De Luce, Dan. “Syrian War Takes Rising Toll on Hezbollah.” Foreign Policy. July 9, 2015.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/syrian-war-takes-rising-toll-on-hezbollah/
This article illustrates the devastating effects the Syrian civil war is having on Hezbollah’s
ranks. Estimates show that while Hezbollah maintains a formidable force of 6,000-8,000
fighting alongside Assad, an estimated 700-1,000 of its fighters had been killed. This
engagement may quickly become Hezbollah’s most deadly conflict as casualty figures
approach figures from the 1985-2000 war with Israel in southern Lebanon. Tehran is
ultimately faced with two choices: continue using Hezbollah to support Assad despite
the group’s losses or scale back its support to preserve Hezbollah’s domestic Lebanese
support and ensure its military preparedness for a potential conflict with Israel.
Sullivan, Marisa. “Hezbollah in Syria.” Middle East Security Report. No.19. Understanding War.
April 2014.
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria
This report states that Hezbollah’s increasing involvement in Syria is one of the most
important aspects of the country’s conflict. Although Hezbollah is secretive regarding
activities in Syria, it is believed that in 2013 its role changed from an advisory capacity to
participating in direct military operations against Assad’s enemies. Hezbollah has a lot to
lose if Assad falls, including safe havens and supply routes for Iranian weapons
shipments. Hezbollah greatly complements the Assad regime with its urban warfare
training and serves as a light infantry division.
Heras, Nicholas. “What is Hezbollah’s Role in the Syrian Crisis.” Jamestown Foundation,
November 2, 2012.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40055&tx_ttnew
s[backPid]=7&cHash=8b8c27af7d2782ec2f41aaa0af35f4b6
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Describes Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict (Nasrallah has publicly
expressed support for Assad and Hezbollah loyalists are fighting alongside the regime’s
forces, though the group claims they’re only there to protect Lebanese civilians), often
in conjunction with Iranian Quds Force units. Also reports that the civil war is
exacerbating tensions in Lebanon, with Hezbollah’s political rivals actively supporting
the rebel movement. Worthwhile piece; article is packed with information.
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF HEZBOLLAH

Byman, Daniel., and Bilal Y. Saab. “Hezbollah in a Time of Transition.” The Brookings Institution.
November 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/11/hezbollah-intime-of-transition-byman-saab
This report examines Hezbollah’s role in domestic and regional politics since its military
campaign to support the Syrian regime in the ongoing civil war. The strategic calculation
to enter the conflict on the side of Bashar al-Assad damages Hezbollah’s position and
brings its domestic Lebanese Shia support base into question. It is costly for Hezbollah
to maintain the status quo, as supporting Assad diverts resources from Lebanon proper,
fails to address the risks of conflict spilling over into Lebanon, strains ongoing domestic
political tensions, and enflames Sunni jihadist narratives to attack Shiite communities.
The article depicts a contemporary Hezbollah that is “overtaxed militarily and on the
defensive politically,” fundamentally changing the nature of the insurgent group.
JAYSH AL-SHABI
OVERVIEW OF JAYSH AL-SHABI

Fulton, Will., Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. “Iranian Strategy in Syria.” Institute for the Study
of War and Critical Threats. (May 2013).
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf
From Pg. 19 onward, this report by the Institute for the Study of War provides
information on Iran’s support for Syrian paramilitaries, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shia militias
fighting for Assad. The Jaysh al-Shabi is identified as a militia Iran has been actively
setting up since 2012 to fight on its behalf in Syria (Shia & Alawite Syrian recruits). These
proxies are vital in keeping supply lines open to reach Hezbollah, in case Assad falls. The
report goes into great detail about the involvement of Hezbollah, which can provide
training and support to Iranian proxies like Jaysh al-Shabi. Some Iraqi Shia militias that
fought U.S. troops in the Iraq war are also being re-oriented to support the Assad
regime in Syria. Similar to Hezbollah and al-Shabi, they can help maintain an open
supply line between Lebanon and Syria for Iranian weapons. The Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas
Brigade is one of the largest conglomerations of Iraqi and Syrian Shia fighters.
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IRAN’S USE OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA

DeYoung, Karen and Warrick, Joby. “Iran and Hezbollah build militia networks in Syria, officials
say.” The Guardian, February 12, 2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/12/iran-hezbollah-milita-networks-syria
This article contains information on the activities of Iran’s sponsored groups’ in Syria.
However, it also discusses the Jaysh al-Shabi group. It points out that Jaysh al Shabi is
receiving training and money from Hezbollah and Iran. The group is thought to be an
Iran-Hezbollah joint venture in Syria receiving millions of dollars of funding from Iran.
Doran, Michael., and Salman Sheikh. “Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now.” Brookings. February 8,
2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/08-arm-syria-rebelsdoran-shaikh
This article is mostly an opinion piece on supporting Syrian rebels. However, it very
briefly mentions the Jaysh al Shabi and describes it as a paramilitary force controlled by
the Syrian state modeled along the lines of Iran’s Basij Militia.
LIWA ABU AL-FADHAL AL-ABBAS
OVERVIEW

“Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) - Syria.” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/liwa%E2%80%99-abu-fadl-al-abbas-lafa-syria
TRAC provides an overview of the Abu Fadl al-Abbas group (LAFA). The group is
composed of Syrian Shia fighters as well as many foreign fighters whose goals is to
protect the Shia Sayida Zaynab Shrine as well as the Shia population south of Damascus.
“Shia Militia Arrive to Defend Shrines.” CNN, July 2, 2014.
http://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2014/07/02/pkg-damon-iraq-shrine-militia.cnn
This link leads to a brief video by CNN on the Abu Fadl al-Abbas brigade.
MILITIAS AND EXTENSION OF SECTARIANISM

Mahmood, Mona and Chulov, Martin. “Syrian War Widens Sunni-Shia Schism as Foreign Jihadis
join Fight for Shrines.” The Guardian, June 4, 2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/syria-islamic-sunni-shia-shrinesvolunteers
This article discusses the Abu al-Fadl group and how it motivates foreign recruits as well
as Syrians to join as part of the defense force protecting the Shia Sayida Zaynad Shrine.
The group is said to have 10,000 volunteers - most of them from outside the country. It
also aims to protect other Shia sites around Syria and has become the direct enemy of
Al-Nusra. It provides other information on LAFA’s recruiting and its objectives.
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ONLINE PRESENCE

Smyth, Phillip. “What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia
“International Brigade” Through Their Social Media Presence. Jihadology. May 15, 2013.
http://jihadology.net/2013/05/15/hizballah-cavalcade-what-is-the-liwaa-abu-fadl-alabbas-lafa-assessing-syrias-shia-international-brigade-through-their-social-mediapresence/
This article published by Jihadology observes the way LAFA markets itself towards Shia
around the world and in the region. It discusses LAFA’s online presence and contains
links to some of their videos. It also provides other miscellaneous information on the
group’s activities.
IRGC - QUDS FORCE
QUDS FORCES IN SYRIA

Saul, Jonathan., and Parisa Hafezi. “Iran Boosts Military Support in Syria to Bolster Assad.”
Reuters. February 21, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/21/us-syria-crisisiran-idUSBREA1K09U20140221
This article points out that Iran greatly increased its support to Assad in the 4th year of
conflict. It says that Iran has been supplying elite troops for intelligence gathering and
intensive training purposes. As part of this increase, more QUDS Force members are
being deployed to Syria.
Fassihi, F. “Iran said to Send Troops to Bolster Syria.” The Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444230504577615393756632230.htm
l
The article reports an up-tick in Iranian military support for the Assad regime, including
the assignment of regular soldiers and IRGC commanders to Syria. Situates the aid
within the context of regional political rivalries – i.e., Iran backed earlier Arab Spring
demonstrations in Sunni states, but has staunchly opposed the popular uprising in Syria,
“the gateway for Iranian influence in the Arab world.” Also cites a statement by an
Iranian general regarding Teheran’s role in Syria.
LEADERSHIP

“Iran's Military Mastermind Promises a 'Surprise' in Syria.” Business Insider/Now Lebanon. June
2, 2015.
http://www.businessinsider.com/irans-military-mastermind-promises-a-surprise-insyria-2015-6
This article points out that the QUDS Force commander, Soleimani, said there will be
surprising victories coming up in Syria. His comments came after he visited Syria in May
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2015 and toured Latakia, where fighting has intensified. Soleimani is said to have met
with the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, field commanders, and Hezbollah officials.
Black, Ian., and Saeed Kamali. “Qassem Suleimani: Commander of Quds force, Puppeteer of the
Middle East.” The Guardian. June 16, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/qassim-suleimani-iraq-iran-syria
This article points out that the IRGC sees the ISIL crisis as another front. It points out
that Syria is the main source of contention for the IRGC.
Filkins, Dexter. “The Shadow Commander.” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander
This 2013 article alleges that QUDS Forces are directing Assad’s fight against Syrian rebels.
Soleimani is said to have been present regularly while overseeing the assembly of various
militias who would continue fighting the Sunni forces; he installed Brigadier General
Hossein Hamedani as commander of these militias. Officers from QUDS also helped Assad
coordinate attacks, train militias, and set up systems to monitor rebel communications.
The report cites some Middle Eastern security officials as saying that the number of QUDS
operatives and Iraqi Shia militiamen in Syria reached into the thousands. The primary
reason behind intervention is to ensure that Syria remains open as a resources supply
route for Hezbollah.
FATIMIYOUN BRIGADE
Neriah, Jacques. “Iran Deploys Afghan Shiite Brigade to Spread Its Control in Southern
Syria.” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. March 4, 2015.
http://jcpa.org/iran-shiite-brigade-syria/
This article points out that the leader of the Afghan Fatimiyoun Brigade, Ali Reza
Tavassoli was killed in March of 2015 near Dera’a, southern Syria. It points out that
family members of the brigade are offered residence in Iran as long as their relatives
fight in Syria. Tavassoli was part of QUDS chief Soleimani’s efforts to bring in upwards of
100,000 foreign Shia fighters to support Assad.

KURDS - SEMI PRO-REGIME
PEOPLE’S PROTECTION UNITS (YPG)
ROLE/IMPACT OF YPG IN SYRIA

"Who are the Kurds?" BBC News, October 31, 2017.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440.
This article from BBC examines America’s ally in Syria and Iraq, the Kurds. The article
digs into where the group comes from, why they don’t have a state, what has made
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them so zealous in their fight against ISIS, and explores their complicated relationship
with their neighbor Turkey. Finally, the article concludes by discussing the motivations
of the group and their struggle for independence.
Perry, Tom. “Syrian Kurdish Militia Expands with its Territory.” Reuters. August 14, 2015.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/14/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-ypgidUKKCN0QJ1LV20150814
This article points out that the YPG has signed up thousands of new fighters following a
string of victories against ISIL in northern Syria. The group’s spokesman says they are
now 40,000 strong. It also provides information on the fighting over Hasakah. In 2015
alone, the YPG doubled the amount of territory it controls.
Callimachi, Rukmini. “Inside Syria: Kurds Roll back ISIS, but Alliances Are Strained.” The New
York Times, August 10, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-islamic-statekurdish-militia-ypg.html?_r=0
This article discusses how the YPG is coordinating with U.S. air power to fight against
ISIL. It also labels the YPG as America’s most effective ally in Syria. It highlights new
dynamics emerging out of Turkey's insistence that Kurdish militias stay away from the
border area in the north.
“YPJ (Women’s Protection unit).” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ypj-womens-protection-unit
This profile by Tracking Terrorism provides information on the all-female wing of the
YPJ. It points out that they are also actively participating in fighting ISIL. It also points out
that male and female Kurds have been fighting side by side for decades.
COORDINATION WITH U.S.
Cafarella, Jennifer, Elizabeth Teoman, and Bradley Hanion. "Syria’s “War After ISIS” Begins As
Turkey Attacks America’s Anti-ISIS Partner." Institute for the Study of War. January 20,
2018. http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syria%E2%80%99s%E2%80%9Cwar-after-isis%E2%80%9D-begins-turkey-attacks-america%E2%80%99santi-isis-partner
Turkey followed their shelling of Kurdish-controlled Afrin with a bombing campaign
targeting U.S. backed Kurds in northern Syria in an attempt to expand the buffer zone
between the Kurds and Turkey. The U.S.’s recent declaration that it would continue to
maintain a relationship and provide support to the Kurdish group created a rift in U.S.Turkish relations. Turkey considers the U.S. backed Kurdish fighters to be a terrorist
organization.
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Stephens, Michael and Aaron Stein. “The YPG: America’s New Best Friend?” Al Jazeera. June
28, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/ypg-america-friend-isilkurds-syria-150627073034776.html
This article analyzes the relationship between U.S. forces and the YPG. It also says that
YPG victories in capturing Tal Abyad and fighting near Hasakah means that they control
a large portion of Syrian territory and have managed to connect the various pockets of
land they control.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS/TACTICS

Pushing Back the Islamic State: The Battle for Rojava (Dispatch 1). Vice News. 2015. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHaaKR1HaFk
This video provides on the ground footage on fighting in and around Hasakah, where the
YPG has been involved heavily.
Night Operation Against the Islamic State: The Battle for Rojava (Dispatch 2). Vice News. 2015.
YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTTHkEe0c2Y
This is another video that provides on the ground footage about fighting in and around
Hasakah.
EUPHRATES VOLCANO
Al Fares, Zaid. “Frontline ISIS: Raqqa Warriors and Kurdish Kobane Heroes Create ‘Volcano’
Coalition to Cut of Islamic State.” International Business Times. February 20, 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/frontline-isis-raqqa-warriors-kurdish-kobane-heroes-createvolcano-coalition-cut-off-islamic-1488815
This article discusses the Volcano Coalition as being composed of Kurdish Kobane
fighters and fighters from Raqqa. It describes the coalition as mainly operating around
Kobane, near the Turkish-Syrian border. However, this grouping is not completely
focused on fighting the Assad regime. Instead it is focused on engaging ISIL.

DRUZE MILITIAS - SEMI PRO REGIME
JAYSH AL-MUWAHHIDEEN
OVERVIEW OF DRUZE MILITIAS

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “The New Druze Militia Factions of Suwayda Province.” Syria
Comment. August 8, 2015. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-new-druze-militiafactions-of-suwayda-province/
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This article discusses the various Druze militia factions of Suwayda Province. It points
out that some of these factions are greater Assad loyalists than others.
Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “The Druze Militias of Southern Syria.” November 13, 2013.
http://www.aymennjawad.org/14038/the-druze-militias-of-southern-syria
This article points out that not much has been written about the Druze militias in Syria’s
civil war. This blogger points out that the Jaysh al Muwahideen are mostly defensive in
nature.
CHOOSING/EVALUATING ALLIANCES

Naylor, Hugh. “In new sign of Assad’s troubles, Syria’s Druze turn away from president.”
Washington Post, July 20, 2015.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-new-sign-of-assads-troublessyrias-druze-turn-away-from-president/2015/07/17/eaf06874-18f7-11e5-bed81093ee58dad0_story.html
This article points out that Druze fighters are shifting away from Assad; however, many
Druze do not support the rebels as they fear they are filled with radical Sunnis. It also
provides other basic information on the Druze militants.
Blanford, Nicholas. “For Syria’s Druze, Survival Hinges on Choosing the Right Ally.” Al Jazeera
America. July 2, 2015. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/2/druze-strugglefor-survival-in-syria.html
The Druzes’ best chance of survival is to choose the right ally. Generally, Druze fighters
prefer to remain neutral in the country’s conflicts; however, this civil war may force
them to choose a side. The article also points out that the Druze have paid “lip service”
to the Assad regime throughout the conflict but are not solidly on one side or the other.

OPPOSITION OVERVIEW:
OVERVIEW OF REBEL GROUPS
“The Opposition” Syria Deeply. http://www.syriadeeply.org/background/opposition/
Provides an overview of how the various major rebel groups such as the Free Syrian
Army, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became involved in the
fighting since the 2011 uprisings. The wide spectrum of fighting brigades among
Islamists and secularists complicate the efforts to find and enforce a ceasefire deal.
“The Moderate Rebels: A Growing List of Vetted Groups Fielding BGM-71 TOW Anti-Tank
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Guided Missiles.” Hasan Mustafas. May 8, 2015.
https://hasanmustafas.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/the-moderate-rebels-a-completeand-growing-list-of-vetted-groups-fielding-tow-missiles/
This analysis outlines how Syrian factions receive BGM-71 TOW tube launched, opticallytracked, wire-guided anti-tank missiles from Arab and Western intelligence agencies. It
presents an overview of dozens of rebel groups that have been supplied with TOW
ATGMs.
AL- NUSRAH COMBINED GROUPS
Joscelyn, Thomas. “Al Nusrah Front, Allies Form New Coalition for Battle in Aleppo.” The Long
War Journal. July 3, 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/al-nusrahfront-new-coalition-aleppo.php
Provides a brief overview of joint ventures led by Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in
2015. By pooling resources, jihadists have had a considerable amount of success in
Syria’s north although they have met resistance from other insurgents in the south.

OPPOSITION - MODERATE COALITIONS/GROUPS:
FREE SYRIAN ARMY
OVERVIEW

“Free Syrian Army.” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/free-syrian-army-fsa
This analysis outlines the FSA’s tactics, targets, and ideology as well as its leadership
structure.
COLLAPSE/FAILURE OF FSA

Banco, Erin. “Four Years Later, The Free Syrian Army Has Collapsed.” International Business
Times, March 14, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.com/four-years-later-free-syrian-army-hascollapsed-1847116
This article discusses the struggling Free Syrian Army. It details the failures of what was
perceived to be a highly competent part of the FSA, the Al Bab.
Giglio, Mike. “U.S. Airstrikes in Syria Leave Rebel Allies to Face Extremist Backlash.”
Buzzfeed. September 24, 2014. http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/us-allies-in-syriamay-end-up-as-victims-of-airstrikes#.lflkLxM93
This article investigates the 13th Division, a group included in a small CIA program to
arm and train moderate rebels. Boasting a number of defectors from the Syrian regime,
the moderate outlook of groups such as the 13th Division present an attractive
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opportunity for Western support. However, as coalition air strikes targeted Jabhat alNusra positions, Western-backed rebels are “undermanned… badly outgunned… and
exposed to retaliation.”
NEW SYRIAN FORCES / DIVISION 30
DIFFICULTIES WITH U.S. TRAINED FORCES

Schmitt, Eric., and Ben Hubbard. “U.S. Revamping Rebel Force Fighting ISIS in Syria.” The New
York Times, September 6, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/middleeast/us-to-revamp-trainingprogram-to-fight-isis.html?_r=0
After Division 30’s tactical defeat to Jabhat al-Nusra, the U.S. shifted its policy by
dropping larger numbers of fighters into safer zones as well as providing better
intelligence and improving their combat skills. An overt program run by U.S. Special
Forces, the Syrian Train and Equip Program (STEP) is struggling to produce a large
quantity of vetted rebels. One of the biggest challenges with the program, according to
the chief of staff of Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, is the lack
of “direct command and control with those forces” once they are embedded into the
battlefield.
Barnard, Anne., and Eric Schmitt. “Rivals of ISIS Attack U.S.-Backed Syrian Rebel Group.” The
New York Times. July 31, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/world/middleeast/nusra-front-attacks-usbacked-syrian-rebel-group.html
This article examines how Jabhat al-Nusra attacked Division 30, leading to the U.S.-led
coalition to conduct airstrikes for the first time in defense of Western-backed rebels.
Coming one day after Jabhat al-Nusra’s abduction of various Division 30 members, the
article details how the al-Qaeda affiliate wants to defeat the U.S.-backed group.
LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF DIVISION 30

Shaheen, Kareem. “US-trained Syrian Rebels Refuse to Fight al-Qaida Group after Kidnappings.”
The Guardian. August 6, 2015.http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/syrianrebels-nusra-front-al-qaida-kidnapping
U.S. trained rebels who suffered kidnappings at the behest of Al Nusra have refused to
fight the AQ affiliate. The article also has other information on Division 30, as well as
some analysis on its rough start.
SOUTHERN FRONT
Khatib, Lina. “Syria’s Last Best Hope: The Southern Front.” The National Interest. July 6, 2015.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/syrias-last-best-hope-the-southern-front-13263
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This article describes the Southern Front as a moderate opposition making gains in the
southern part of the country. It points out that empowering the Southern Front is
important as the Assad regime is not targeting ISIL and is allowing it to attack the
moderate opposition. This article also points out that the Southern Front is a sub
coalition of FSA fighters.
Rand, Dafna H,. and Nicholas Heras. “The South Will Rise Again.” Foreign Policy.
December 29, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/29/the-south-will-rise-againsyria-deraa-southern-front/
This article provides a list of groups that had signed on to the Southern Front moderate
coalition. It also provides various analysis regarding this coalition.

OPPOSITION - ISLAMIST COALITIONS/GROUPS
AL QAEDA - JABHAT AL-NUSRA
OVERVIEW

Casagrande, Genevieve . "Al Qaeda Clearing the Path to Dominance in Southern Syria." Institute
For the Study of War. November 22, 2017.
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-clearing-path-dominancesouthern-syria.
AQ is seeking to establish a greater foothold in Syria by targeting the leadership of antiAssad opposition groups and Syrian government officials as well. Almost 50 percent of
the assassinations and attempts were against U.S. backed or formerly U.S. backed
groups. This map details the target types and methods utilized from August 5, 2017 to
November 21, 2017.
Shaheen, Kareem. “US-trained Syrian Rebels Killed and Leaders Captured by al-Qaida Affiliate.”
The Guardian. July 31, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/31/us-trained-rebels-killed-capturedsyrian-al-qaida-affiliate-nusra
This article describes how the first group of U.S. trained and backed Syrian fighter were
immediately attacked and disrupted by Al Nusra.
Corcoran, Mark. “Islamist Militant Group Al Nusra Re-Emerging as Key Rebel Faction Fighting to
Overthrow Bashar al-Assad.” ABC News Australia. May 15, 2015.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-15/jabhat-al-nusra-explainer/6473404
This article discusses Jabhat al-Nusra’s presence in northwest Syria and its competition
with ISIL. Jabhat al-Nusra continues to take advantage of the international community’s
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focus on ISIL by seizing large quantities of weapons from rival militant groups, capturing
Syrian cities, and overrunning a strategically significant military base.
“Jabhat al-Nusra” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University. November 12, 2014.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493
A detailed account of leadership, ideology, tactics, and relationships with other groups is
provided in this piece.
“Profile: Syria’s al-Nusra Front” BBC. April 10, 2013.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18048033
This article describes the group’s role in the Syrian civil war after al-Nusra rejected
merging with the Islamic State of Iraq.
Arango, Tim., Anne Barnard, and Hwaida Saad. “Syrian Rebels Tied to Al Qaeda Play Key Role in
War.” The New York Times, December 8, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/middleeast/syrian-rebels-tied-to-alqaeda-play-key-role-in-war.html?hp
Describes Jabhat al-Nusra as “one of the uprising’s most effective fighting forces” and
the “lone Syrian rebel group with an explicit stamp of approval from AQ.” It also ties the
group to AQI and wealthy Gulf state patrons. Reports show that the strategies and
tactics of Nusra fighters reflect lessons learned from AQI’s experience in the 2000s. The
U.S. plans to blacklist the group as a terrorist organization, which requires a new look at
the dynamics of the larger opposition movement.
THREAT TO U.S.

Ackerman, S. “Al-Qaeda Faction in Syria Contemplates U.S. attack, IC warns.” The Guardian,
January 29, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/29/al-qaida-syrianusra-front-intelligence-threat
The Nusra Front “does have aspirations for attacks on the homeland”, James Clapper,
the director of national intelligence, told the Senate intelligence committee. Clapper
pointed to the deterioration of Syria during three years of violence – a situation he
compared to the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) in Pakistan that became a
haven after the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan for al-Qaida. Evidence also existed of
training complexes and over 26,000 “extremist” fighters in Syria.
AL QAEDA - KHORASAN GROUP
Yan, Holly. “Terrorist Leader Killed in Drone Strike -- but What is the Khorasan Group?” CNN.
July 22, 2015.
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/22/world/what-is-the-khorasan-group/
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This article provides a description of the Khorasan Group, a collection of al-Qaeda
operatives who moved to Syria with a mission to find new ways to attack the U.S. and
Europe. In comparison to other groups such as ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, the Khorasan
Group is believed to use most of its energy plotting external attacks in the West.
Kedmey, Dan. “Worse Than ISIS? A Primer on the Khorasan Group.” Time. September 23, 2014.
http://time.com/3421701/khorasan-al-qaeda-iraq-isis-syria/
This article provides a brief overview of the Khorasan Group’s strength, leadership, and
tactics.
AHRAR AL-SHAM
OVERVIEW

“Ahrar al Sham / Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya.” Terrorism Research and Analysis
Consortium. http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ahrar-al-sham-harakat-ahrar-alsham-al-islamiyya
Tracking terrorism describes Ahrar Al Sham as a typical guerrilla group. It points out that
Ahrar al Sham has not been involved in suicide bombings and mainly focuses its efforts
against government forces. It also points out that this group coordinates and works with
Jabhat Al Nusra. The link also contains some videos on the group.
AL-SHAM’S AQ TIES INHIBIT U.S. COOPERATION

Hubbard, Ben. “In Syria, Potential Ally’s Islamist Ties Challenge U.S.” The New York Times.
August 25, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/world/middleeast/ahrar-alsham-rebel-force-in-syrias-gray-zone-poses-challenge-to-us.html
This article points out that Ahrar Al- Sham is one of the most powerful groups fighting
Assad and has even called for engagement with the West. The article also states that
beating Assad may require the U.S. to cautiously engage with groups like Ahrar Al Sham.
Ford, Robert S., and Ali El Yassir. “Yes, Talk with Syria’s Ahrar al-Sham.” Middle East
Institute. July 15, 2015. http://www.mei.edu/content/at/yes-talk-syria%E2%80%99sahrar-al-sham
This opinion piece describes the Ahrar Al- Sham as the “most important” group fighting
against Assad. The author also argues that the U.S. should open a dialogue with the
group, even though it is closely associated with Nusra. It also says that Ahrar al Sham is a
radical group that promotes Islamic law.
ANSAR AL-SHARIA
Joscelyn, Thomas. “Al Nusrah Front, Allies Form New Coalition for Battle in Aleppo.” Long War
Journal, July 3, 2015.
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http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/al-nusrah-front-new-coalitionaleppo.php
This entry provides information on the latest Islamists coalition coming out of Syria, the
Ansar Al Sharia. This coalition includes Jabhat Al Nusra, Ahrar Al Sham, Ansar Al Din, and
other likeminded Islamist groups for the Battle of Aleppo. The article also provides a
brief overview of joint ventures led by Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in 2015. By
pooling resources, jihadists have had a considerable amount of success in Syria’s north
although they have met resistance from other insurgents in the south.
Mrou, Bassem. “Syrian Rebel Coalition Ansar al-Sharia Launches Attacks in Aleppo.” The Star,
July 3, 2015.
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/07/03/syrian-rebel-coalition-ansar-alsharia-launches-attacks-in-aleppo.html
This article describes further fighting carried out by the Ansar al Sharia coalition against
government troops in control of Aleppo.
LEVANT FRONT
Lund, Aron. “The Levant Front: Can Aleppo’s Rebels Unite?” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. December 26, 2014.
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=57605
This article provides information on the Levant Front coalition. This coalition was
composed of nearly all the Sunni extremist groups, except Al Qaeda and ISIL.
ISLAMIC FRONT
“Islamic Front - Syria.” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-front-syria-0
This link provides information on the Islamic Front coalition. This was an older coalition,
formed in 2013, and is composed of the major rebel groups in Syria. The group included:
Harakat Ahrar as-Sham, Suqur as-Sham, Liwa at-Tawhid, Jaysh al-Islam, Jabhat alKurdiyya, Liwa al-Haqq and Ahrar as-Sham.
HARAKAT HAZZM
Ali, Abdallah. “Jabhat al-Nusra Overtakes Hazm in Aleppo Countryside.” Al Monitor, March 3,
2015.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2015/03/syria-aleppo-countryside-hazmmovement.html
This article points out how Harakat Hazm was given advanced U.S. weapons such as
TOW missiles. However, the group was still overrun by Jabhat al Nusra. It also points out
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how international coalition airplanes did not help Hazm when Nusra stormed all of its
strongholds and defeated the group.
Dettmer, Jamie. “Main U.S.-Backed Syrian Rebel Group Disbanding, Joining Islamists.” The
Daily Beast. March 1, 2015. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/01/mainu-s-backed-syrian-rebel-group-disbanding-joining-islamists.html
This article points out how the Harakat Hazm was one of the U.S.’ favorite groups to
sponsor. However, recently the group has been disbanding after facing a string of
defeats at the hands of various Islamists. More and more of its members are also linking
up with ISIL.
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